Domestic Strategy and International Opportunity: The Abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir

This study presents a historical and analytical examination of the domestic, bilateral, and international factors—particularly the role of the United States—that may have contributed to the change in the administrative status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019, when Article 370 of the Indian Constitution was abrogated. The explanation centers on three interrelated factors: first, U.S. President Donald Trump’s mediation offers, made amid deepening trade and defense relations between the United States and India; second, the entrenched political positions of Kashmiri parties that made Article 370 central to their identity politics; and third, the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) long-standing ideological commitment to the principle of “one nation, one constitution.” We argue that President Trump’s mediation offer provided a strategic window that the BJP administration effectively leveraged to move forward with its long-held policy objective.

The analysis thus concludes that international developments were not merely external pressures but instruments that were consciously used to recalibrate domestic policy. However, our findings do not support the view that international coercion, whether by the United States or Pakistan, directly determined the policy outcome. Nor do they fully align with explanations that locate the decision solely within domestic politics. Instead, the abrogation of Article 370 represented the culmination of a long-prepared plan implemented under favorable international circumstances.

Despite substantial commentary on the political and constitutional implications of the abrogation, relatively limited scholarly attention has been paid to the strategic rationale and timing of this decision. Existing analyses tend to emphasize either ideological continuity or reactive politics, often neglecting how domestic imperatives and international contexts intersected in shaping the policy moment.

This study, therefore, asks:

What strategic and contextual factors led to the abrogation of Article 370, and how did domestic political imperatives align with external conditions to enable its implementation?

By addressing this question, the study situates the 2019 abrogation as a case of deliberate strategic decision-making, wherein domestic political consolidation was synchronized with perceived international opportunity.

The following section provides a historical overview to familiarize readers with Kashmir’s politics and its importance in India’s diplomatic and security affairs. Subsequent sections examine the BJP’s ideological position on Article 370, the political dynamics of Kashmiri parties, and the evolution of U.S. engagement with the Kashmir issue, culminating in President Trump’s mediation offer and its timing relative to the 2019 policy shift.

An Historical Overview of the Kashmir Conundrum

India and Pakistan have fought three direct wars as well as a prolonged proxy conflict over Kashmir, making it one of the longest-standing disputes in modern history. Pakistan has repeatedly sought to bring the issue to international forums for third-party mediation, whereas India has consistently treated Kashmir as an internal matter and maintained that bilateral dialogue can only resume once cross-border terrorism ceasesⁱ.

At the time of the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir chose not to join either India or Pakistanⁱⁱ. Because Jammu and Kashmir had a Muslim-majority population, Pakistan attempted to annex it by sending armed tribal groups to seize the territory. In response, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession with the Indian government on October 26, 1947, granting limited powers to the Union of India in matters of defense, foreign affairs, and communications, while retaining substantial autonomy over internal governanceⁱⁱⁱ.

On October 17, 1949, Article 370 was incorporated into the Constitution of India by the Constituent Assembly, granting Jammu and Kashmir special status^iv. The provision exempted most Indian constitutional laws from automatically applying to the state and allowed it to draft its own constitution. Parliament’s authority to legislate for Jammu and Kashmir was restricted: for matters included in the Instrument of Accession, mere consultation with the state government was required, but extending central laws to other subjects required the state government’s concurrence^v. Over the years, political and legal changes gradually diluted these provisions, alongside central interventions in state-level elections designed to maintain pro-India parties in power. Despite wars with Pakistan in 1965 and 1999 and an insurgency since 1989 that claimed over 40,000 lives, India maintained Kashmir’s special status until 2019.

On August 5, 2019, the Indian Parliament introduced and passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Bill, converting the state into two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh^vi. The Home Minister at the time, Amit Shah, questioned the relevance and validity of the special status conferred under Articles 370 and 35A, framing the move as necessary for national integration and governance^vii. These constitutional changes had been debated and predicted for decades but were implemented decisively at this moment.

Tensions between India and Pakistan escalated earlier that year after 44 Indian paramilitary soldiers were killed in a suicide attack in Pulwama, carried out by the Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammad^viii. The attack brought the two countries close to war and fostered heightened nationalist sentiment within India, reinforcing political support for the BJP government^ix. Although studies suggest that the electoral impact of such incidents is mixed, they created a context in which decisive political action was politically feasible^x.

The international dimension also played a role. The United States, which maintains defense and economic relations with both India and Pakistan, urged restraint and de-escalation. Between July and October 2019, President Donald Trump offered to mediate the dispute^xi. Trump emphasized that any dialogue would require India’s consent, consistent with India’s longstanding rejection of third-party involvement under the 1972 Simla Agreement. His comments reflected a long history of U.S. proposals for mediation dating back to the 1950s, supported by Pakistan and opposed by India.

The abrogation of Article 370 was also shaped by the BJP’s ideological commitment, extending back to its predecessor, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, and its broader organizational base, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. For seven decades, these organizations opposed Jammu and Kashmir’s special status and repeatedly advocated its integration into the Indian Union through election manifestos and policy proposals^xii. The convergence of these domestic ideological imperatives with favorable international conditions created a window of opportunity, which the BJP strategically leveraged to implement its long-held objectives.

This historical overview demonstrates how the legal, political, and international contexts intersected to create the conditions for the 2019 policy shift. It sets the stage for a closer examination of the BJP’s ideological persistence, the internal political dynamics of Kashmir, and the role of external actors.

RSS-BJP and the Special Status of Kashmir

The election manifestos of the BJP have repeatedly called Jammu and Kashmir an integral part of India, assuring the electorate that it will abrogate Article 370 and 35A of the Constitution of India, once it gains power;^xiiian aspect of the party’s platform that originates with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). The RSS was founded by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925 with the aim of uniting what he perceived as a fragmented Hindu society.^xiv He believed that Hindus and the Vedic culture have suffered due to 800 years of Muslim rule, and based on traditional Hindu scriptures that indicated Kashmir had a Hindu origin,^xvthe RSS does not recognize the mass conversions to Islam in Kashmir, which began in the 13th century CE.^xvi

Since its accession to India on October 26, 1947, the Kashmir issue has been an ideological battle for the BJS. Specifically, the BJS has followed its founder Syama Prasad Mookerjee’s dictum that “there cannot be two law codes, two national symbols, and two political chiefs”.^xvii Mookerjee often argued that India as a multi-ethnic nation would risk balkanization if it granted special status to Kashmir.^xviiiThe BJS was consistently vocal on the issue: a statement of its Central Working Committee (CWC) meeting in Delhi on June 14, 1952 says, “[we are] empathetically of the view that Jammu and Kashmir state is an integral part of India and that economic and social advancement of the state requires its integration with India. The provisions in the Indian Constitution about J&K were admittedly of a temporary character.”^xix Similarly, in the CWC meeting on December 31, 1952 in Kanpur, a resolution was passed saying that the Satyagrah had been launched against the Sheikh Abdullah government of J&K, and against the two constitutions, two flags and two prime ministers within one nation, and calling for Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of India. The resolution accepted on February 10, 1953, in the CWC meeting in Delhi recorded that Praja Parishad, an affiliated wing of the BJS, called for governing the entire State of Jammu-Kashmir according to the Constitution of India. In 1964, the highest decision-making body of the RSS, the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha, in its resolution titled “Bharat’s Kashmir Policy”, said that Article 370 was incorporated in the Indian Constitution as a temporary provision on Kashmir and that it must be immediately repealed and the state brought in line with the other states of India.^xx The same demand was repeated by the Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal of the RSS in 1982 and at various other RSS forums in 1984, 1986 and 1993.^xxi

However, the BJP’s position on Kashmir as an integral part of India did not preclude the BJP from seeking a settlement with Pakistan over the sections administered by Pakistan. In 1983, then President of the Party Atal Bihari Vajpayee accused Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of creating an impression that India was “avoiding a discussion”, adding “[t]here is no reason why the mere mention of Kashmir by Pakistan should upset India”.^xxii He also chided Indira Gandhi for not having resolved the matter via the Simla Agreement and argued that India should challenge Pakistan’s unilateral administrative separation of Gilgit, Kargil, Hunza and other regions from Kashmir as it stood in 1947.^xxiii

In his 1986 address to the plenary session of the party’s annual meeting, party president Lal Krishna Advani reiterated the BJP demand “that Article 370 be repealed,” arguing that there was neither any “legal” nor “constitutional” difficulty.^xxiv In the context of the Congress Party then having more than two-thirds of the seats in parliament, he stated “if the Parliament decides it by a two-third majority, all that is needed to remove the temporary provision from the Constitution is endorsement by the J&K [Jammu and Kashmir] Governor”.^xxv He further argued that the ongoing imposition of Governor’s Rule—wherein the state legislature is suspended and the state is administered by the Governor—in combination with Article 370 meant that the Governor was technically not fully responsible to parliament.^xxvi Later that year, Advani reiterated the Shyama Prasad Mookerjee position and stated that the “BJP will not rest until this one-third also is achieved and until, by repeal of Article 370, a separate Constitution for J&K also is scrapped”.^xxvii

After the insurgency in Kashmir began in 1989, the BJP continued its opposition to Article 370. A 1990 resolution by the party’s National Executive reiterated that Article 370 had “alienated and aggrieved” Kashmiris because it “helped produce and sustain corrupt and incompetent [state] regimes”.^xxviii In 1993, Advani called for the Article’s abrogation as well as the settlement of ex-military personnel in Kashmir to create a “new Indian security zone”.^xxix In 1994, however, concerns about the geographic spread of the insurgency affecting the hitherto peaceful (majority Hindu) region of Jammu were articulated by Advani, who stated that the Indian government’s “first and foremost task” was to “restore the administration and curb insurgency with a firm hand”.^xxx

In 1995, the RSS, for the first time, demanded a separate autonomous council for the Jammu region on the grounds that the state government was neglecting the area.^xxxi In 1996, the organisation’s Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal passed a resolution demanding abrogation of Article 370, saying it was temporary in nature and had become completely defunct. In 2000, with the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led NDA government at the Centre, the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly passed a resolution for autonomy, which was opposed by RSS in its resolution, saying that if Article 370 had been repealed, this situation would not have occurred.^xxxii

In 2002, the RSS raised the demand for a separate Jammu state for the first time. In 2010, the Akhil Bharatiya Pratinidhi Sabha passed another resolution on Article 370, saying that instead of being a ‘temporary and transitional provision’, Article 370 ‘continues to be a tool in the hands of the separatists and secessionist elements.’^xxxiii

In 2014, the first Narendra Modi-led NDA government assumed power with the first single-party majority since 1984, and won another single-party majority in 2019. On August 5, 2019, the Modi government passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 removing the special status enjoyed by Jammu and Kashmir.^xxxiv A Delhi-based journalist Yogesh Kant adds that “since the times of Syama Prasad Mookerjee, and more particularly throughout the election campaigns of 2014 and 2019, the BJP has been rigorously calling for making Kashmir fully integrated with the rest of the country and was successful in making it a winning factor for them.”^xxxv

Regional Parties and Reflections of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir Politics

The special status of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution of India remained the core issue around which the politics of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to the Indian state were viewed.^xxxvi This section shows how the political parties of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir vary in their position on Article 370 over time and between each other. The cause of such variation is related to distinct positions on religious identity, electoral calculations, and reactions to the Indian government’s policies.

Article 370 was seen along the lines of religion by different communities living in different regions of the state. The Muslims of the state, especially those living in the Kashmir valley, felt emotional satisfaction as it kept them free from what they called the Hindu-dominated government in Delhi^xxxvii, whereas, a section of Hindus of the state, who were predominantly in Jammu, had agitated against Article 370 and what they called Kashmir-centric Muslim rule^xxxviii.

From Opposition to Acceptance of Article 370: the National Conference and People’s Conference

Two political parties in Kashmir have evolved in their position on Article 370. The National Conference (NC), founded in 1932, fifteen years before the Partition of India, has moved from accepting the law and working within it to opposing it, and then returning to its original position of acceptance. The People’s Conference founded in the late 1970s initially rejected Article 370, but has come to accept it.

The NC, as the main post-colonial political party, consistently negotiated with the masses and the central government to keep the special status of Jammu and Kashmir intact.^xxxix It is worth mentioning that the Kashmir-centric political leadership spearheaded by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah^xl, the leader of the NC and the state’s first Prime Minister, was primarily in favor of full autonomy of the state instead of full integration with India.^xli However, there is some evidence to show that NC’s demands became gradually aligned with the assimilation of the state into the Union of India.^xlii

The erosion of autonomy under Article 370 began in 1952, when Nehru and Abdullah entered into what became known as the Delhi Agreement on centre-state relations. It was decided that under the agreement the Union flag would occupy the supremely distinctive place in the state (which had its own flag)^xliii and the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be extended to the state in regard to the fundamental rights as well as in respect to disputes between states and between the state and the centre^xliv; Kashmiris^xlv would be citizens of India; the provisions of Indian Constitution (Articles 52 to 62) relating to the President of India should be applicable to the state, the Governor (Sadar-i-Riyasat) is to be elected by the state legislature but he could not assume office without the consent of the President of India. Moreover, Article 352 of the Constitution of India which deals with the “Emergency Powers” of the President was also made applicable to the state with a sub-clause.^xlvi

After 1952, the Praja Parishad, an affiliate wing of the BJS, launched an agitation for ‘one constitution, one flag and one president’. This led to the apprehensions among Kashmiri Muslims regarding the distinct character of the state.^xlvii The rise of Islamic identity-based movements and the Sheikh’s determined pursuit of independence or full autonomy of the state and refusal to accept the full merger with Union of India became the reason for his dismissal and arrest on August, 1953.^xlviii

One of the Sheikh’s top aides, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, was installed as the new Prime Minister of Kashmir.^xlix The tenure of Bakhshi is known for steady erosion of the special status of J&K given under Article 370.^l Bakshi’s stint saw the finalization of details of Kashmir’s accession to India. In 1954, the Constituent Assembly formally ratified the accession of the state which was to legitimize the Instrument of Accession signed between Maharaja and India in 1947. The custom barrier between Kashmir and the rest of India was also lifted. Later, in 1957 the state of Jammu and Kashmir drafted its own constitution.^li

The government of Prime Minister Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq continued the pro-India policies of Prime Minister Bakshi. The Presidential Order dated 21 December 1964 enabled the President to govern the state of Jammu and Kashmir directly and was resented by opponents of India’s increasing control over the state.^lii Continuing to strengthen the links of the state and the Union of India, in the year 1964-65 Articles 356-357 of the Indian Constitution were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 356 empowers the central government to dismiss elected provincial governments, and Article 357 gives the central government power to assume all legislative functions of the latter. Article 249, which empowers the Parliament to legislate on the subjects on the provincial list, was extended to Jammu and Kashmir in 1986 eradicating traces of substantial autonomy given to Kashmir. ^liiiliv

However, two years after the Sheikh’s dismissal, in 1955 a senior National Conference leader Mirza Afzal Beg launched the All–Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or Plebiscite Front,^lvwhich represented the Sheikh’s supporters.^lvi In a letter to Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shashtri, on March 17, 1965, Sheikh Abdullah expressed his disapproval of various actions and discussions of the members of the government against Article 370.^lvii He believed that such acts would be a setback to the confidence and trust built between the state and the Union of India by Jawaharlal Nehru.^lviii Upon his release, Sheikh Abdullah organized “All Parties People’s Convention” in 1968 to discuss the solutions to Kashmir issue^lix, but his efforts gained limited success.^lx In 1971, the government of India also banned the Plebiscite Front.^lxi

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reinitiated dialogue Sheikh Abdullah in 1975, which resulted in the Indira-Abdullah Accord of 1975.^lxii The agreement allowed Sheikh Abullah to take over as the head of state.^lxiii Interestingly, in 1975 Sheikh Abdullah renounced the self-determination platform.^lxiv It appears that Pakistan’s defeat in the 1971 war with India weakened Abdullah’s position,^lxv whilst also granting India more security vis-à-vis control of Kashmir. In return of Abdullah’s release and his reinstatement as Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, his deputy, Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg signed another agreement called the Indira-Sheikh Accord, 1975. This agreement reaffirmed Kashmir’s incorporation into the Indian Union and was instrumental in almost the complete end of the movement for self-determination.^lxvi This accord paved the way for the first reasonably democratic elections held in 1977.^lxvii

However, the Sheikh’s popularity declined soon thereafter primarily because of his policy of abolishing food subsidies. He responded to some statements of newly elected Janata Party leaders supporting the revocation of Article 370 by stating that it could lead to secession from the Union of India.^lxviii Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai reiterated that Article 370 will remain intact,^lxix which resolved the crisis.

Sheikh Abdullah died in 1982, and during the elections of 1983 state elections, the National Conference did not highlight the idea of secession or autonomy. Thus, in its political journey, the National Conference came to present Article 370 as a guarantee of the distinct socio-political identity of the state and claimed to be the guardian of the state’s identity, honor and dignity in nearly all of its political campaigns.^lxx

Another Kashmiri political party that had a similar evolution over Article 370 as their core political issue has been the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference or People’s Conference. Abdul Ghani Lone, expelled from the Congress Party in 1976, formed the People’s Conference in 1978. He termed Article 370 a means used by the Indian state to erode the autonomy that was originally possessed by the state post-partition.^lxxi The People’s Conference was dedicated to “the restoration of ‘internal autonomy’ in Kashmir”.^lxxii He did not find any link between autonomy and Article 370. In contrast to Abdul Ghani Lone, the People’s Conference’s current chairman, Sajad Gani Lone, has called Article 370 an article of trust arguing that any change in it would disturb the relationship between the state and the Union of India.^lxxiii

The Jamaat-i-Islami and the All Parties Hurriyat Conference: Rejection of Article 370

Another state party, Jamaat-e-Islami, was against Article 370. Jamaat-e-Islami was a far right party, which positioned itself as a political party based on Islamic principles. It has criticized the idea of Kashmiri nationalism^lxxiv, which came up during the debates of NC in the late 1970s^lxxv. Instead, it demands that Jammu and Kashmir should join Pakistan on the basis of the two-nation theory^lxxvi. The head of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) Molvi Umer Farooq finds Article 370 meaningless and a non-issue.^lxxvii All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), an umbrella organization of pro-independence parties, emerged in the post-1989 phase of Kashmiri politics. For APHC, self-determination of Jammu and Kashmir is the only solution to this issue.

The People’s Democratic Party: Working Within Article 370

The changing political scenario of the state after the beginning of the insurgency in 1989 saw the arrival of a new political party – the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Article 370 finds special mention in the manifesto of the PDP.^lxxviii The PDP believes that Article 370 is required to empower people and that its preservation is linked with the issue of identity, borders and governance. Establishing a case for the importance of Article 370, the PDP has asserted that it covers everything “from political discourse to personal responses, economy to emotions, society to sensibilities and institutions to ideologies”^lxxix, and, interestingly, is justified as it annuls the two-nation theory of partition^lxxx. Its leader and former chief minister of J & K Mehbooba Mufti had promised to keep fighting for the special status of Jammu and Kashmir provided under Article 370 at every forum including courts.^lxxxi

How accepting Article 370 advantages certain state parties:

The National Conference and People’s Democratic Party’s acceptance of Article 370 has allowed them to work with successive national governments in India. Whereas the National Conference historically created coalitions with the Congress Party, the People’s Democratic Party has intermittently allied with the BJP. This, despite the national parties undermining of Article 370 to rule the state:^lxxxii as mentioned above, the BJP’s from a position of ideological opposition and the Congress Party’s in practice. Commenting on the state-level parties and their stand on Article 370, an expert says^lxxxiii,

[the] National Conference has always talked about autonomy while PDP asked for self-rule. Since the period post-independence and signing of the Instrument of Accession, regional parties especially the National Conference projected the idea of internal autonomy with a conditional accession with the Union of India. The same views were held by PDP that sought self-rule since its formation.^lxxxiv

Allying with the Congress Party and the BJP, however, has undermined these parties’ popular legitimacy in Kashmir. another expert asserts^lxxxv,

to counter the blame that these parties were in hand and gloves [sic] with the central government in making Article 370 a mere formality with the dilution of almost all the powers and liberty of the state, these parties came up with these proposals (autonomy and self-rule) which could have been achieved only in the presence of Article 370.^lxxxvi

The political maneuvers of the mainstream political parties of Jammu and Kashmir post-abrogation of Article 370 indicate that the special status of the state by virtue of Article 370 has been their political lifeline.^lxxxviiBoth the National Conference and the Peoples Democratic Party welcomed the Indian National Congress manifesto for the 2019 general elections which stated that Article 370 will not be changed. ^lxxxviii

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful to Dr. Vasabjit Banerjee (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA) for his detailed and constructive feedback on the early drafts of this paper. Professor Mikhail Ilyin (HSE University, Moscow) provided valuable guidance during the development of the manuscript. The authors also thank Dr. Patrick Sawyer (University of Coimbra), Dr. Neelmani Jayswal (Visva-Bharati University), Dr. Ranjit Dehury (University of Hyderabad), and Aleksei Opacic (Harvard University) for their helpful comments and suggestions that contributed to improving the paper.  

Notes

i “Conflict Between India and Pakistan,”Council of Foreign Relations, accessed December 20, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-between-india-and-pakistan.
See also: Navnita Chadha Behera, “Terror Trail Leads from Kabul to Kashmir,” Brookings,May 25, 2002, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/terror-trail-leads-from-kabul-to-kashmir/,
Siddhartha Pradeep, “Game theory, Strategies and the convoluted triangle – India, Pakistan, Kashmir,” Econstor, 2019, https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/195929/1/main%20article.pdf.

ii Adarsh Sein Anand, “ACCESSION OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR STATE – HISTORICAL & LEGAL PERSPECTIVE,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 43, no. 4 (2001): 455-68, accessed November 29, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/43953394.

iii Sajid Ali, “How, on this day 72 years ago, Jammu & Kashmir agreed to become a part of India”. The Print, October 26, 2019, https://theprint.in/past-forward/how-on-this-day-72-years-ago-jammu-kashmir-agreed-to-become-a-part-of-india/311724/

Anand, “KASHMIR’S ACCESSION TO INDIA,” 69-86.

iv “Explainer: What is Article 370?”, The Hindu Business Line, August 5, 2019, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/national/explainer-what-is-article-370/article28822446.ece.

v Faizan Mustafa, “Explained: What are Articles 370 and 35A?”, The Indian Express, August 06, 2019, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/understanding-articles-370-35a-jammu-kashmir-indian-constitution-5610996/

vi”THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR REORGANISATION BILL, 2019”,accessed November 23, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article28823852.ece/Binary/FullTextofJ&KReorganisationBill.pdf

vii Speeches/interviews, Ministry of Home Affairs, https://mha.gov.in/node/98243.

viii “Pulwama attack 2019,” The Hindu, accessed December 20, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/topic/pulwama-attack-2019/.

ix Ganguly, Sumit and Himanshu Jha. “The BJP’s Puzzling Victory: Was It about Hindu Nationalism?” The Washington Quarterly 42.3 (2019): 25-39.

Chhibber, Pradeep and Rahul Verma. “The Rise of the Second Dominant Party System in India: BJP’s New Social Coalition in 2019.” Studies in Indian Politics 7.2 (2019): 131-148.

x Hintson, Jamie and Milan Vaishnav. “Who Rallies around the Flag? Nationalist Parties, National Security, and the 2019 Indian Election.” American Journal of Political Science67.2 (2023): 342-357.

xi “PM Modi asked me to mediate between India and Pakistan on Kashmir: Trump,” The Hindu, July 22, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-offers-to-mediate-between-india-and-pakistan-on-kashmir/article28660299.ece

“Would intervene on Kashmir ‘if wanted’ by India, Pak: Trump,” The Hindu, August, 02, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/would-intervene-on-kashmir-if-wanted-by-india-pak-trump/article28789882.ece
“Once again, US says Trump is ready to mediate between India, Pakistan over Kashmir dispute,” India Today, October 25, 2019, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/us-says-trump-is-ready-to-mediate-between-india-pakistan-over-kashmir-dispute-1612775-2019-10-25

xii “Shyama Prasad Mukherjee: Remembering ‘party inspiration’ on Jayanti, Modi, Shah pay tributes,” DNA, July 6, 2019, https://www.dnaindia.com/india/photo-gallery-shyama-prasad-mukherjee-remembering-party-inspiration-on-jayanti-modi-shah-pay-tributes-2769005.

See also: Saad Bin Omer, “जम्मू-कश्मीर : ‘एकविधान, एकप्रधान, एकनिशान’ कोछोड़ ‘इंसानियत, कश्मीरियत, जम्हूरियत’,” NDTV, March 1, 2015, https://khabar.ndtv.com/news/india/insaniyat-kashmiriyat-jamhuriyat-instead-of-ek-vidhan-ek-pradhan-ek-nishan-for-bjp-743448.
Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, “BJP reminds people of ‘ek nishan, ek vidhan, ek pradhan’,” The Free Press Journal, June 30, 2018, https://www.freepressjournal.in/analysis/bjp-reminds-people-of-ek-nishan-ek-vidhan-ek-pradhan
“Bharatiya Janata Party Election Manifesto 2009,” BJP Library,accessed on November 23, 2020,
http://library.bjp.org/jspui/handle/123456789/262

“BJP Election Manifesto 2014, Highlights”, accessed November 23, 2020, http://cdn.narendramodi.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Manifesto2014highlights.pdf

“Sankalpit Bharat, Sashakt Bharat. Bhartiya Janata Party Sankalp Patra 2019”, BJP, accessed November 23, 2020https://cutt.ly/Jjb5zZE

xiii “Bharatiya Janata Party Election Manifesto 2009,” BJP Library,accessed on November 23, 2020,
http://library.bjp.org/jspui/handle/123456789/262

“BJP Election Manifesto 2014, Highlights”, accessed November 23, 2020, http://cdn.narendramodi.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Manifesto2014highlights.pdf

“Sankalpit Bharat, Sashakt Bharat. Bhartiya Janata Party Sankalp Patra 2019”, BJP, accessed November 23, 2020https://cutt.ly/Jjb5zZE

xiv “Timeline”, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, accessed December 20, 2020 https://www.rss.org/Timeline.html
“Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh,” Britannica, accessed December 20, 2020 https://www.britannica.com/topic/Rashtriya-Swayamsevak-Sangh

xv Gerald James Larson, “The Aesthetic (Rasasvada) and the Religious (Brahmasvada) in Abhinavagupta’s Kashmir Saivism,” Philosophy East and West 26, no.4 (1976): 371. doi:10.2307/1398282
See also: Yoginder Sikand, “Hazrat Bulbul Shah: The First Known Muslim Missionary in Kashmir,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 20, no. 2 (2000): 361–367. & S.M. Iqbala, Krishna Lal Kalla and K.L. Nirash (Eds.). The Culture of Kashmir (New Delhi: Marwah Publishers, 1978), 103.

xvi Ghulam Muhyi’d Din Sufi, Kashir A History Of Kashmir Vol1, (New Delhi : Light & Life Publishers, 1974) 35-36.  “RSS and Kashmir,” Greater Kashmir, November 29, 2014, https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/opinion/rss-and-kashmir/

xvii Balraj Madhok, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee: A Biography, (New Delhi: Deepak Prakashan, 1954) 142.
See also: Samyak Pandey, “Syama Prasad Mookerjee — the BJP ideologue whose political ideas find echo even today,” The Print, June 23, 2019, https://theprint.in/theprint-profile/syama-prasad-mookerjee-the-bjp-ideologue-whose-political-ideas-find-echo-even-today/253334/

xviii MonideepaBanerjie, “How BJP Paid Its Debt To Founder Syama Prasad Mookerjee With Kashmir Move,”NDTV, August 05, 2019, Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/article-370-scrapped-how-bjp-paid-its-debt-to-founder-syama-prasad-mookerjee-with-kashmir-move-2080682

xix Amit Shah, “Mookerjee to Modi: How the RSS dream of ‘integrating’ Kashmir was fulfilled,” Business Standard, August 5, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/how-modi-fulfilled-rss-dream-of-kashmir-s-integration-119080501139_1.html.

xx Purnima S. Tripathi, “RSS’ agenda on Kashmir in action,” Frontline, August 30, 2019, https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article29059214.ece

xxi Ibid.

xxii Vajpayee, Atal B.. “National Council, Surat, 4-6 June, 1983.”President’s Addresses: A.B. Vajpayee, 1980-1986. New Delhi: Excelprint, 2000. 55-86. Pg. 74-75

xxiii Vajpayee, Atal B.. “National Council, Surat, 4-6 June, 1983.” Pg. 74-75

xxiv Advani, Lal Krishna. “The Plenary Session, New Delhi, May 9, 1986.” President’s Addresses: L.K. Advani, 1986-1990, 1993-1998. New Delhi: Excelprint, 2000. 1-22. Pg. 9-10.

xxv Advani, Lal Krishna. “The Plenary Session, New Delhi, May 9, 1986.” 2000. Pg. 9-10

xxvi Advani, Lal Krishna. “The Plenary Session, New Delhi, May 9, 1986.” 2000. Pg. 9-10

xxvii Advani, Lal Krishna. “National Executive, Jammu, October 17, 1986.” President’s Addresses: L.K. Advani, 1986-1990, 1993-1998. New Delhi: Excelprint, 2000. 26-27. Pg. 26

xxviii “Kashmir Situation, National Executive, Calcutta, April 6-8, 1990.” BJP Resolutions : Political, 1980-1999. 123-125. Pg. 123.

xxix Advani, Lal Krishna. “National Council Session, Bangalore, June 18, 1993.” President’s Addresses: L.K. Advani, 1986-1990, 1993-1998. New Delhi: Excelprint, 2000. 104-126. Pg. 118-119.

xxx Advani, Lal Krishna. “National Executive, Hyderabad, March 20, 1994.” President’s Addresses: L.K. Advani, 1986-1990, 1993-1998. New Delhi: Excelprint, 2000. 132-136. Pg. 135

xxxi Purnima S. Tripathi, “RSS’ agenda on Kashmir in action,” Frontline, August 30, 2019, https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article29059214.ece

xxxii Purnima S. Tripathi, “RSS’ agenda on Kashmir in action,” 2019.

xxxiii Ibid.

xxxiv “THE JAMMU AND KASHMIR REORGANISATION BILL, 2019”, The Hindu, accessed November 23, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/resources/article28823852.ece/Binary/FullTextofJ&KReorganisationBill.pdf.

xxxv Yogesh Kant, email message to first author, February 02, 2020.

xxxvi Sumit Mitra, “J&K elections: Farooq Abdullah desperate to legitimise popular support”India Today, June 15 1983, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19830615-j-k-elections-farooq-abdullah-desperate-to-legitimise-popular-support-770732-2013-07-19

xxxvii Lord Birdwood, Two nations and Kashmir. (London: Robert hall,1956), 178.

xxxviii Gupta, Kashmir-A study in India-Pakistan relations, 378.

xxxix Priyanka Bakaya and Sumit Bhatti, “Kashmir Conflict – A Study of What Led to the Insurgency in Kashmir Valley”, accessed December 2, 2020, https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/Kashmir%20Conflict%20-%20A%20Study%20of%20What%20Led%20to%20the%20Insurgency%20in%20Kashmir%20Valley.pdf
See also: Sameer P. Lalwani and Gillian Gayner, “Report. US Institute of Peace,” (2020): 16, accessed December 2, 2020, doi:10.2307/resrep25405,
Mahaveer Golecha, “Integration of Kashmir for peace and prosperity,” The Lancet, September 4, 2019, https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(19)32077-X/fulltext ,

Amitabh Hoskote and Vishakha A. Hoskote. “JAMMU & KASHMIR & THE POLITICS OF ARTICLE 370: SEEKING LEGALITY FOR THE ILLEGITIMATE,” People: International Journal of Social Sciences 3, no. 1(2017): 813-835, accessed December 2, 2020 ,https://grdspublishing.org/index.php/people/article/view/474

xl Hereafter Sheikh Abdullah, Abdullah or SMA

xli Walter Lawrence, The Valley of Kashmir (Srinagar: Kesar Publications,1967), 203.
See also: Prakash Chandra,”The National Question in Kashmir.”Social Scientist 13, no. 6 (1985): 51, accessed December 12, 2020. doi:10.2307/3520318. .

xlii Herea reference can be made to the policies of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. See: SunrinderMohan, “Democracy In Jammu And Kashmir 1947–2008.”World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues 16, no. 3 (2012): 95-98, accessed December 6, 2020.https://www.jstor.org/stable/48504940.
Also: Gull M. Wani and N .Naqash, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Ashis Publishing, 1993), 31-37.

xliii The Union Government agreed that the State should have its own flag in addition to the Union flag,whereas the State Government admitted that the State flag would not be a rival of the Union flag; it was also recognised that the Union flag should have the same status and position in Jammu and Kashmir as in the rest of India, See: “The Delhi Agreement 1952”, South Asian Terrosim Portal, accessed on December 2, 2020, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/documents/papers/delhi_agreement_1952.htm

xliv Hindustan Times, 25 July, 1952.

xlv Native Kashmiri people with domicile are referred here as Kashmiris. The state legislature was empowered to make laws in this subject.

xlvi Article 352 empowers the President to proclaim a general emergency in the State; the State Government argued that in the exercise of its powers over defence (Item 1 on the Union List), in the event of war or external aggression, the Government of India would have full authority to take steps and proclaim emergency. See: “PART XVIII, EMERGENCY PROVISIONS”, The Constitution of India, accessed on December 2, 2020, https://www.mea.gov.in/Images/pdf1/Part18.pdf During the discussion, the state delegation was not in favour of the President proclaiming a general emergency on account of internal disturbance. Both parties agreed to add a subclause to apply a modified version of the Article 352.The sub-clause states: “but in regard to internal disturbance at the request or with the concurrence of the Government of the State.” See: “The Delhi Agreement 1952”, South Asian Terrosim Portal, accessed on December 2, 2020, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/documents/papers/delhi_agreement_1952.htm
See also: Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 80.
In other Indian States the Head of the State was appointed by the President and was as such his nominee but the person to be appointed as the Head, had to be a person acceptable to the Government of that State. In the case of Kashmir lies only in the fact that Sadar-i-Riyasat will in the first place be elected by the State legislature itself instead of being a nominee of the Government and the President of India.See: “The Delhi Agreement 1952”, South Asian Terrosim Portal, accessed on December 2, 2020, https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/documents/papers/delhi_agreement_1952.htm

xlvii Gull Wani’s interview with Balraj Puri on 15^th March 1987 cited in Gull M. Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, 30.

xlviii Chandra, “The National Question in Kashmir,” 51.
See also: Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict, (London: Pall Mall P, 1968) 99

xlix B. L. Kak, The Fall of Gilgit: The Untold Story of Indo-Pak Affairs from Jinnah to Bhutto, 1947 to July 1977, (New Delhi: Light and Life, 1977) 27

l Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict , 97.

li Ibid, 94.

lii Ibid, 105.

liii SumantraBose, The Challenges in Kashmir,Democracy,Self determination and a just peace, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997) 34-35.

liv Between 1964 to mid 1970s, 28 constitutional orders and 262 Union laws were made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir, thus slowly merging Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. See: Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 88.

lv Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 95

lvi Gull M. Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, 31

lvii Sheikh Abdullah wrote to Shastri, “…The government of India took certain steps vis-à-vis Kashmir which gave a clear indication that no settlement was intended. The statements of responsible members of government declaring their intention to erode the content and spirit of Article 370, the application of Articles 356 and 357 (Indian Constitution), and also the oft-repeated characterization of accession of the State as “final and irrevocable” are instances in point which gave a serious set-back to a measure of confidence that we had built during the last days of Pandit Nehru.” See: Nyla Ali Khan, “Letter to Indian Premier Lal Bahadur Shastri, March 17, 1965,” in Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah’s Reflections on Kashmir, (Springer, 2018) 33.

Also: Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumphs and Tragedy of Indian Federalism, (New Delhi: Sterling Publications, 1981), 169.
& Prem Nath Bazaz, Democracy through intimidation and terror: The untold story of Kashmir Politics, (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1978) 67.

lviii “SHEIKH ABDULLAH TO LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI IN 1965,” Kashmir Ink, October 26, 2017, http://www.kashmirink.in/news/politics/sheikh-abdullah-to-lal-bahadur-shastri-in-1965/464.html

lix David E.Lockwood, “RESOLVING THE PROBLEM OF KASHMIR.”World Affairs 133, no. 3 (1970): 208-10, accessed December 12, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671214

lx Syed Mir Qasim, Dastan-e-Hayat, pp 297-98 as cited in Gull M. Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, 31

lxi Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 97.

lxii Ibid.

lxiii Ibid, 32.

lxiv It shows the overall changing political scenario of the state in view of the changes in the centre-state relations.

lxv Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 1947 to 1966, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) 27.

lxvi P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1994) 57.

lxvii Bose, The Challenges in Kashmir, Democracy,Self determination and a just peace, 41.

lxviii Times of India (New Delhi) May 24, 1977; Times of India (New Delhi) June1 1977 cited in Gull Wani, 32.

lxix Bazaz, Democracy through intimidation and terror: The untold story of Kashmir Politics, 67.

lxx Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, 33.

lxxi “A VOICE FROM KASHMIR,” Frontline, August 3, 2002, https://frontline.thehindu.com/cover-story/article30245640.ece.
See also: Lawrence Lifschultz, “Death in Kashmir: Perils of ‘Self-Determination’,”Economic and Political Weekly 37, no. 31 (2002): 3225-234, accessed November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4412435 .

lxxii Frontline, August 3, 2002

lxxiii “35A, 370 ‘Articles of Trust’: Sajad Lone,” The Tribune, April 1, 2019,https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/archive/j-k/35a-370-articles-of-trust-sajad-lone-751279 .
See also: SafwatZargar, “The Third Front: Could Sajjad Lone’s People’s Conference be a new force in Kashmir politics?” Scroll.in, December 4, 2018, https://scroll.in/article/903587/the-third-front-could-sajjad-lones-peoples-conference-be-a-new-force-in-kashmirs-politics

lxxiv After the 1975Accord, Jamaat-e-Islami was very critical of the politics of NC and warned the people of Kashmir not to be carried away by the propaganda about Article 370 by NC. Sheikh, in turn, criticized the JIJK by calling it as fundamentalist organization and enemy to the Kashmiri culture and traditions. See also: Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumphs and Tragedy of Indian Federalism (New Delhi: Sterling Publications, 1981), 169.

lxxv Toru Tak, “The Term “Kashmiriyat”: Kashmiri Nationalism of the 1970s,”Economic and Political Weekly 48, no. 16 (2013): 28-32, http://www.jstor.org/stable/23527257.
See also: Sumit Mitra, “J&K elections: Farooq Abdullah desperate to legitimise popular support”India today, June 15 1983, https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/cover-story/story/19830615-j-k-elections-farooq-abdullah-desperate-to-legitimise-popular-support-770732-2013-07-19
& Wani, 35.

lxxvi Two-nation theory was a concept which evolved from the belief that Muslims and Hindus of the Indian sub-continent are separate civilizations which are inherently incapable of peaceful existence as being two opposite nations .This theory is based on the premise that socio-cultural and religious differentiation between Hindus and Muslims warrants a creation of a separate country for Muslims

For more on the Two-nation theory refer to:

Speeches, Writings, and Statements of Iqbal, compiled and edited by Latif Ahmed Sherwani (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977 [1944], 2nd ed., revised and enlarged), pp. 3-26. http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html#03

M. Iqbal, “Sir Muhammad Iqbal’s 1930 Presidential Address to the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League Allahabad, 29 December 1930”, accessed on 08 June 2020 http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html

M. A. Jinnah, “Presidential address by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the Muslim League Lahore, 1940” accessed 07 June 2020, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html

6. K. Warikoo, “Islamist extremism in Kashmir,” in Religion and Security in South and Central Asia, ed. K. Warikoo (New York: Routledge, 2011) 70-75.

See also: “Muslim bodies question way of abrogating Article 370 provisions,” Business Standard, August 28, 2019, https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/muslim-bodies-question-way-of-abrogating-article-370-provisions-119082801681_1.html

lxxvii Safeena Wani, “Top Kashmir leader: Article 370 is non-issue,” Aljazeera, May 29, 2014, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2014/05/29/top-kashmir-leader-article-370-is-non-issue/

lxxviii Swarnima Bhattacharya, “J&K Polls: Article 370 in PDP Manifesto,” Inshorts, November 29, 2014, https://inshorts.com/en/news/j-amp-amp-k-polls-article-370-in-pdp-manifesto

lxxix Peerzada Ashiq,” J&K polls: Article 370 figures in PDP manifesto,” Hindustan Times, November 29, 2014, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/j-k-polls-article-370-figures-in-pdp-manifesto/story-U7eyKx3tQ7WPWD2ZYzzR1H.html

lxxx “Jammu & Kashmir polls: PDP’s manifesto promises ‘Self Rule’,” Firstpost, November 28, 2014, https://www.firstpost.com/politics/jammu-kashmir-polls-pdps-manifesto-promises-self-rule-1826055.html

lxxxi Hakeem Irfan Rashid, “Article 370 haunts BJP-PDP coalition in J&K, again,” The Economic Times, February 1, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/article-370-haunts-bjp-pdp-coalition-in-jk-again/articleshow/56904637.cms?from=mdr

lxxxii See: Azaan Javaid, “Why Abdullahs, Mehbooba are silent on Article 370 and what it means for Kashmir politics,” The Print, April 28, 2020, https://theprint.in/politics/why-abdullahs-mehbooba-are-silent-on-article-370-and-what-it-means-for-kashmir-politics/410490/.

lxxxiii An expert, email message to first author, April 15, 2020.

lxxxiv Detailed account of the “Self-rule framework” can be found at: “Jammu and Kashmir Self-Rule Framework”, Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party, July 24, 2018, https://jkpdp.org/self-rule/self-rule-framework/

lxxxv An expert, email message to first author, April 15, 2020.

lxxxvi As a sign of its disapproval of the revocation of Article 370, on August 10, 2019 the National Conference (NC) filed a petition in the Supreme Court of India challenging the constitutional validity of ‘The Jammu and Kashmir (Reorganisation) Act, 2019.’ (Bagariya, 2019). See also: “National Conference challenges Centre’s move on Article 370 in Supreme Court,” The Hindu, August 10, 2019, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/national-conference-challenges-centres-move-on-article-370-in-supreme-court/article28974370.ece.

lxxxvii Post-abrogation of Article 370, mainstream political parties especially the National Conference and the PeoplesDemocratic Party formed an alliance namely “People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration” with the aim of securing the restoration of Article 370 and getting statehood back. The joint statement of the alliance, known as the ‘Gupkar Declaration’, strongly opposes the abrogation of Article 370 and 35A and consideres conversion of state into two Union Territories viz, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh as unconstitutional and an aggression against the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Political parties of J & K, whohave been contesting against each other,have now joined hands in order to save their political future which as per some experts relies heavily on Article 370. The alliance also fought the first-ever District Development Council (DDC) polls held in Jammu and Kashmir. The DDC pollswere the first major electoral exercise after the erstwhile state lost its special status. For more on the Gupkar Declaration see: “WHAT IS GUPKAR DECLARATION?” Business Standard, accessed December 23, 2020https://www.business-standard.com/about/what-is-gupkar-declaration

lxxxviii “Congress releases manifesto for 2019 Lok Sabha elections, promises wealth and welfare,” The Economic Times, April 3, 2019,https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/elections/lok-sabha/india/congress-releases-manifesto-for-2019-lok-sabha-polls-details-here/articleshow/68684073.cms. See also:Tariq Bhat, “PDP, NC welcome Congress manifesto promises to Kashmir,” The Week, April 2, 2019, https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2019/04/02/pdp-nc-welcome-congress-manifesto-promises-kashmir.html.