Domestic Strategy and International Opportunity: The Abrogation of Article 370 in Jammu and Kashmir

India-U.S. Relations and Kashmir

Year	U.S. Administration	Key Event/Action	U.S. Perception/Position on Kashmir
1947-48	Harry S. Truman	First Indo-Pak War	Supported UN resolution for plebiscite; viewed Kashmir as an international issue.
1950s	Dwight D. Eisenhower	Cold War Dynamics	Preferred bilateral resolution but initially supported international mediation.
1962	John F. Kennedy	Sino-Indian War	Favored India with military support; sought resolution on Kashmir for broader regional stability.
1965-66	Lyndon B. Johnson	Second Indo-Pak War	Took a neutral stance; refrained from deep involvement due to Vietnam War commitments.
1971	Richard Nixon	Indo-Pak War over Bangladesh	Tilted towards Pakistan, causing a strain on U.S.-India relations; less focus on Kashmir.
‍1974	Richard Nixon	India’s first nuclear test bomb	U.S. is caught off-guard as nuclear arms technology is spreading despite international treaty on non-proliferation
‍‍1983	Ronald Reagan	Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb test (cold fission, Kirana-I)	U.S. is caught off guard as Pakistan is an ally in relation to Afghanistan. Yet the U.S. is unable to prevent Pakistan from being armed.
1990	George H. W. Bush	Rising Indo-Pak Tensions	Attempted to defuse tensions; acknowledged Kashmir’s potential for nuclear conflict escalation.
1993	Bill Clinton	Post-Cold War Era	Initially questioned the Instrument of Accession; later supported Simla Agreement, emphasizing bilateral talks.
1998-99	Bill Clinton	Nuclear Tests by both India and Pakistan & Kargil War	Urged dialogue between India and Pakistan; focused on crisis management rather than mediation.
2001	George W. Bush	Post-9/11 Era	Prioritized strategic partnership with India and crisis management; avoided aggressive mediation.
2009	Barack Obama	Early Administration	Attempted to engage India and Pakistan for peace dialogue; limited involvement in deference to bilateral resolution.
2019	Donald Trump	Mediation Offer	Proposed mediation in Kashmir, diverging from long-standing U.S. policy of non-involvement in bilateral disputes.

As the above table demonstrates, different U.S. administrations have attempted to intervene between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This section briefly introduces various aspects of Indo-U.S. relations followed by strategies of different U.S. administrations towards the Kashmir dispute. The analysis presented here indicates that the U.S. sought to mediate between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute during the Cold War era. However, the U.S. accepted India’s position in the post-Cold War era. Parallel to this acceptance, U.S. India trade and defense relations also flourished. Thus, when President Trump offered to mediate—a return to an older position—it was an offer based on U.S.’ greater leverage over India, an offer India could not refuse.

Cold War Era U.S. Involvement in Kashmir: The Frustrated Overtures of the U.S.

With respect to the Kashmir dispute, initially Washington engaged deeply in the affair in order to bring a settlement between India and Pakistan. The first war between India and Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir took place in 1947-48. Immediately after the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan on January 1, 1949, the United States played an important role in drafting the United Nations resolution for a plebiscite in Kashmir.ⁱ The United Nations Security Council appointed Admiral Chester Nimitz, a former U.S. navy officer, as the plebiscite administrator. This was what Nehru rejected despite pressure from President Harry S. Truman.ⁱⁱ President Truman initiated talks with Indian and Pakistani leaders to find a solution to the Kashmir problem, but to no avail.

When U.S. President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson raised the Kashmir issue with Nehru, the Indian government set as a precondition for talks with Pakistan that they would proceed only once Pakistan had withdrawn its forces from Kashmir.ⁱⁱⁱ Due to the uncompromising position of Nehru on the issue of a plebiscite and the perception of President Truman as ‘unsympathetic and hostile’ towards India’s position, the efforts to find a solution to the dispute reached a stalemate.^iv

Subsequently, President, Dwight D. Eisenhower, also sought to be involved in the Indo-Pak dispute resolution. However, India rejected his initiative saying that any resolution to the differences between India and Pakistan could only be achieved through direct talks between them, indicating that India was not interested in third-party mediation.^v Later, on 23 January 1957, at the UN Security Council India declared that Kashmir was an integral part of India^vi, thus closing the doors to any multilateral mediation. In December 1959, during his visit to India and Pakistan, President Eisenhower refrained from proposing any new initiative to break the stalemate between India and Pakistan.^vii

The Kennedy administration took extra measures to resolve the Kashmir issue. mainly due to the Chinese attack on India in 1962, which made Nehru seek military assistance from the U.S..^viii Despite Pakistan’s opposition, President Kennedy provided military and diplomatic support to India.^ix This war gave the Kennedy administration an opportunity to influence India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.^x Moreover, due to the new international dynamics evolving during this time, the U.S. and India came closer in order to counter communist China.^xi However, these initiatives were also unable to achieve the desired result for the Kashmir dispute.

Soon after the 1962 Indo-China war, two delegations- British and American- visited India and Pakistan to meet with Nehru and Ayub Khan to convince them to start negotiations on Kashmir without any pre-conditions. After several rounds of failed negotiations, the Kennedy administration came up with a new proposal which argued in favour of division of the Kashmir valley for a long-term geostrategic settlement. Once again, India refused to agree on a third-party proposal as this one sought division of the Kashmir valley.^xii

Due to its engagements in the Vietnam war, the Johnson administration did not take much interest in the Kashmir dispute.^xiii The Johnson administration took a neutral position during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. President Lyndon B. Johnson welcomed the Soviet Union’s efforts to persuade India and Pakistan to restore the status quo ante bellum.

Responding to the potentially explosive nature of the Kashmir problem, President Richard M. Nixon renewed U.S. interest in the region.^xiv He said that the solution to this issue must be responsive to the desires of the Kashmiri people. The Nixon administration believed that American policy could play a role in bringing peace on the sub-continent. The balanced diplomatic position held by the U.S. tilted towards Pakistan when in the 1971 Indo-Pak war the U.S. favored Pakistan, affecting the Indo-U.S. relations.^xv

Another chapter in U.S.-Indian relations started in 1974, when Indian nuclear bomb tests surprised the world. The U.S. and other nuclear powers had signed the treaty of non-proliferation (NPT) in 1968, in order to prevent other countriesfrom obtaining nuclear arms. not allowing countrieswho previously had not had nuclear arms to obtain these. The Indian nuclear tests would prove that this policy did not work. This event would sour relations between India and the U.S. for the next two decades. Pakistan followed suit in 1983 with a cold fission test (Kirana-I) ^xvi, against the wishes of the U.S. and despite working as an ally of the U.S. in relation to the war in Afghanistan^xvii.

Immediately after assuming office the George H. W. Bush administration had to deal with the rising tensions between India and Pakistan due to a Pakistan-supported secessionist movement in Kashmir.^xviii The Bush administration understood that the tensions between the two nuclear armed South Asian neighbors could result in a war.^xix This also highlighted the connection between the Kashmir issue and possible nuclear war between India and Pakistan.^xx U.S. National Security Advisor Robert Gates and Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly visited both India and Pakistan in 1990 to defuse the tensions^xxi and resolve the Kashmir issue through the Simla Agreement of 1972.^xxii The administration believed that the idea of the plebiscite was out of question in the given situation.

The Post-Cold War Shift in U.S. -India Relations: U.S. Recalibrates its Role on Kashmir

Taking a different view, the Clinton administration held that the whole of Kashmir (including the Pakistan-occupied area of Kashmir) was a disputed territory.^xxiii In contrast to the previous administration’s position, the Clinton administration considered theSimla Agreement of 1972 ineffective.^xxiv It believed the involvement of the people to be crucial to the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. However, India’s reluctance forced the Clinton administration into supporting the Simla agreement of 1972.^xxv In order to revive dialogue between India and Pakistan, President Clinton tried to pursue leaders of both countries- Nawaz Sharif and I. K. Gujral – separately at the UN in New York in September 1997.^xxvi

India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998^xxvii, which brought the Clinton administration’s focus back to the Kashmir issue.^xxviii President Bill Clinton launched a diplomatic campaign asking for the resolution of various issues between India and Pakistan including Kashmir with proper dialogue.^xxix In 1999, India and Pakistan engaged in another war in the Kargil District of Indian Kashmir. It was the timely mediation by the Clinton administration that prevented it from escalating into a full-scale – and possibly a nuclear – war.^xxx Clinton stressed that the use of violence to restore the situation was not acceptable.^xxxi

Ending wars as well as defusing tensions between India and Pakistan was the main focus of three successive U.S. administrations- George H.W. Bush, Clinton and George W. Bush. President George W. Bush ruled out any sort of U.S. involvement in resolving the Kashmir issue. He said that the United States cannot force nations to reach an agreement^xxxii and that the U.S. can only play the role of a facilitator between India and Pakistan.^xxxiii

Both Clinton and his successor Bush showed their willingness to ‘facilitate’ a resolution of the Kashmir issue only if India and Pakistan wanted their intervention. On this point, India opposed the third-party involvement, whereas Pakistan tried to internationalize the issue.

Post- 9/11, the U.S. changed its security relations with Pakistan^xxxiv and developed a serious strategic partnership with India, but limited its involvement in the Kashmir issue because India and Pakistan started a peace process. The U.S. role was focused more on crisis management than on peace-building in Kashmir.

President Obama showed his willingness to help resolve the Kashmir issue by engaging both India and Pakistan in a constructive bilateral dialogue. He said that the solution to the Kashmir issue has to be found by both India and Pakistan and that any outside solution on the issue cannot be imposed^xxxv.

Current U.S.-India Relations and Implicit Risks of Denying U.S. a Role in Kashmir

India and the U.S. are now considered “Enduring Global Partners in the 21^st century”.^xxxvi Cooperation between India and the United States is ‘broad-based and multi-sectoral’^xxxvii, with shared interests in promoting global security, economic prosperity through trade, investment and connectivity.^xxxviii The relationship between the two countries has reached an ‘extraordinarily good place’ with upgrading defense cooperation, resolving the issue of civil nuclear energy and developing a common understanding on a range of international issues.^xxxix

The total value of U.S.-India bilateral trade during 2005 to 2017-18 grew from USD 37 billion to USD 115 billion.^xl In the last five years the arms trade between India and the United States has seen an increase of more than five times. During the years of the Trump administration, the U.S. became the second largest arms supplier to India^xli. The recent years also saw the completion of two crucial military agreements-the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed in 2018 and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), in addition to an Industrial Security Annex in 2019 to the U.S.-India General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) concluded in 2002.^xlii The strategic military relations between the two countries have also seen a great improvement in almost all the crucial areas of defense including holding of joint military exercises keeping in view India’s security concerns with regards to China and Pakistan.

Moreover, the efforts of two decades combined with a mutual concern about the increasing ties of China^xliii with Pakistan,^xliv as well as a shared realization that both countries need to work together to tackle global challenges like climate change and transnational terrorism have improved this relationship.^xlv The criticism of Indian government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 by China has added a stronger dimension to Indo-China relations as well as India’s regional security concerns.^xlvi The strengthening of QUAD ties and Indian support for the U.S. criticism of China also reflect the growing ties between India and the United States.^xlvii Furthermore, the July 24, 2018 bill passed by the U.S., which allows India to purchase S-400 Russian air defense missile systems without U.S. sanctions, shows a favorable U.S. policy towards India.^xlviii The growing trade and military relations between the two countries are an outcome of mutual security and trade objectives.

President Trump’s Mediation Offer and the Two-Level Game

In July 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump offered to mediate between India and Pakistan over the Kashmir issue, introducing a complex strategic dimension for New Delhi. This offer emerged within the broader context of deepening U.S.-India trade and defense ties, the U.S.’s concern over China’s regional influence, and India’s longstanding policy rejecting third-party involvement in Kashmir. Analysts have offered multiple explanations for the offer: facilitating U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, exerting leverage on India in trade negotiations, or reflecting Trump’s personalized, idiosyncratic style of diplomacy. While these analyses differ in emphasis, they converge on one point: India’s core policy stance on Kashmir was unlikely to be swayed solely by external pressure.

The offer intersected with heightened domestic and regional tensions following the February 2019 Pulwama terror attack, which killed 44 Indian paramilitary personnel. The attack escalated India-Pakistan relations to the brink of war, amplifying the salience of Kashmir in domestic politics. In this context, Trump’s proposal functioned as a strategic inflection point: ignoring the U.S. risked undermining broader bilateral cooperation, while engagement provided an opportunity to frame India’s response as internationally legible without compromising sovereignty.

Critical analysis of the motivations behind the U.S. offer highlights its primarily instrumental character. C. Raja Mohan argued that the offer reflected U.S. strategic calculations vis-à-vis China, positioning India as a counterbalance. Others emphasized U.S. interest in Pakistan’s cooperation for facilitating the Afghanistan withdrawal or in shaping trade relations with India. These assessments underscore that the U.S. interest in Kashmir was mediated through broader geopolitical and economic objectives, rather than specific concern for Article 370.

Yet, the BJP’s response demonstrates how domestic actors can exploit international contexts to advance entrenched policy goals. Evidence suggests the U.S. was aware of India’s intentions regarding Article 370 during Prime Minister Imran Khan’s July 2019 Washington visit. India consistently reaffirmed that Kashmir remained a bilateral issue, but the BJP effectively leveraged the U.S. offer to frame domestic policy as strategically timely.

This interpretation is reinforced by the BJP’s own account. Praveen Khandelwal, BJP MP for Chandni Chowk, Delhi, reflects that during Trump’s first presidency (2017–2021), India-U.S. relations grew substantially, underpinned by shared strategic interests, including countering China, increasing defense cooperation, and aligning on regional security. He notes that following the Pulwama attack, Trump condemned Pakistan’s role in harboring terror groups, aligning with India’s concerns, and that the President “admired Modi’s strong leadership and found common ground in their nationalist ideologies.” Khandelwal emphasizes that this alignment allowed India to act decisively on Kashmir while maintaining a favorable international narrative. By 2025, the BJP portrays Trump less as an external actor exerting pressure and more as an enabling partner whose statements created a temporal window that the party strategically leveraged.

This episode illustrates the two-level game framework: domestic actors reconciled internal constraints—including ideological commitment, parliamentary majority, and opposition from Kashmiri parties—with international circumstances to implement policy. The abrogation of Article 370 reflects the BJP’s capacity to synchronize domestic objectives with external openings, demonstrating strategic agency rather than simple reaction to international coercion.

Conclusion

The geopolitical dynamics surrounding Jammu and Kashmir have been complex and multifaceted, rooted in the historical partition conflicts and shaped by persistent regional and international tensions. The 2019 abrogation of Article 370 by the Indian government marked a significant shift in this volatile landscape. The analysis herein demonstrates that this decision was not merely a fulfillment of BJP’s long-standing domestic agenda influenced by its ideological affiliates like RSS, nor purely an outcome of international pressure. Instead, it was a strategic maneuver, leveraging external diplomatic stimuli, such as President Trump’s mediation offer, to consolidate domestic political goals.

This investigation highlights that while international mediation offers, notably by the United States, have recurred historically, they have functioned variably based on the internal political calculus and geopolitical interests at play. The abrogation was emblematic of how global geopolitical interactions, particularly those involving prominent powers like the U.S., can catalyze shifts in domestic policy landscapes.

In essence, this case underscores the interdependence between international diplomacy and domestic politics, demonstrating how states may exploit geopolitical opportunities to achieve longstanding national objectives while addressing domestic political resistance. Going forward, the implications of such actions on regional stability and international relations remain a critical area for ongoing observation and analysis.

Acknowledgement

The authors are grateful to Dr. Vasabjit Banerjee (University of Tennessee, Knoxville, USA) for his detailed and constructive feedback on the early drafts of this paper. Professor Mikhail Ilyin (HSE University, Moscow) provided valuable guidance during the development of the manuscript. The authors also thank Dr. Patrick Sawyer (University of Coimbra), Dr. Neelmani Jayswal (Visva-Bharati University), Dr. Ranjit Dehury (University of Hyderabad), and Aleksei Opacic (Harvard University) for their helpful comments and suggestions that contributed to improving the paper.  

Notes

i Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 61.

ii SHAILENDER SINGH JAMWAL, “THE U.N. RESOLUTIONS ON KASHMIR – WITHDRAWL OF PLEBISCITE OFFER.”Proceedings of the Indian History Congress 55 (1994): 551-55, accessed November 29, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/44143409

iii Kux, India and the United States, 62.

iv Norman Palmer, The United States and India (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), 121–22.

v PIA KRISHNANKUTTY, “Why Modi-Trump bonhomie reminds India, US of Nehru and Eisenhower,” The Print, September 27, 2019,https://theprint.in/india/why-modi-trump-bonhomie-reminds-india-us-of-nehru-and-eisenhower/297567/

vi Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966), 313–15.
See also: Tooba Khurshid, “United Nations Security Council Resolutions: Status of the People of Jammu and Kashmir,”Strategic Studies 36, no. 4 (2016): 100-22, accessed November 29, 2020, doi:10.2307/48535976.

vii Kux, The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000, 109.
See also: “U.S. Policy on Kashmir Was Formulated by Eisenhower”, accessed December 20, 2020, https://www.indiawest.com/news/india/u-s-policy-on-kashmir-was-formulated-by-eisenhower/article_ba4a471c-4d63-11e5-9671-3f5a582ac39e.html

viii Dheeraj Kumar, “Indo-U.S. Relations: Historical Perspectives,” Strategic Insights, Volume VIII, Issue 3 (August 2009)
Bhagat Vats, Foreign Intrigue Against India, (New Delhi: Aman Publishers, 1967) 81.

ix AjaiShukla , “America’s role in 1962,” Business Standard, December 22, 2015, https://www.business standard.com/article/beyond-business/america-s-role-in-1962-115122201076_1.html.
See also: Anvar Alikhan, “In 1962, India and US were ‘that’ close to becoming allies in a war against China,” Scroll.In, January 23, 2016,https://scroll.in/article/802276/in-1962-india-and-us-were-that-close-to-becoming-allies-in-a-war-against-china ;

BRUCE RIEDEL, “How Kennedy supported India against China in 1962 war,” Dailyo, January1, 2016, https://www.dailyo.in/politics/pakistan-china-1962-war-jawaharlal-nehru-tawang-jf-kennedy-pla-aksai-chin-operation-gibralter-grand-slam-kashmir/story/1/8503.html;
Colonel Anil Athale, “The Untold Story: How Kennedy came to India’s aid in 1962,” Rediff.com, December 4, 2012, https://www.rediff.com/news/special/the-untold-story-how-the-us-came-to-indias-aid-in-1962/20121204.html ; “Nehru sought U.S. help during 1962 Indo-China war: book,” The Hindu, October 14, 2015, https://www.thehindu.com/news/nehru-sought-us-help-during-1962-indochina-war-book/article7761071.ece

x “From the past pages of dawn: 1967: Fifty years ago: Nixon visit,” Dawn, April 20, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1328007

xi Kux, India and the United States, 201–8. Also: Vats, Foreign Intrigue Against India, 81.

xii See Sumit Ganguly, Conflict unending: India-Pakistan tensions since 1947, (New York : Columbia University Press, 2001) 31–35.
K. N. PANDITA, “Revisiting Indo-Pak Negotiations on Kashmir 1962-63,” The Kashmir Herald, December 7, 2020, http://www.kashmirherald.com/main.php?t=OP&st=D&no=190 , C. Raja Mohan and Howard B. Schaffer, “The United States and Kashmir: When Less Is More,”Asia Policy, no. 10 (2010): 219-22, accessed November 27, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24905020

xiii RathnamIndurthy, “The Turns and Shifts in the U.S. Role in the Kashmir Conflict since 1947: Today’s Propitious Times for a Facilitator to Resolve It.” Asian Affairs 32, no. 1 (2005): 35-38 accessed December 23, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172627

xiv “From the past pages of dawn: 1967: Fifty years ago: Nixon visit,” Dawn, April 20, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1328007

xv See Ganguly, Conflict Unending, 51–78.
See also: Ankit Agarwal, “The United States and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971: A Critical Inquiry,”Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 27/28, no. 1/2 (2014): 21-42, accessed November 29, 2020, http://www.jstor.org/stable/43857990.

xvi Kapur, S. Paul, and Sumit Ganguly. “The Transformation of U.S.-India Relations: An Explanation for the Rapprochement and Prospects for the Future.” Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (2007): 642–56. https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2007.47.4.642.

xvii William Burr, “New Documents Spotlight Reagan-era Tensions over Pakistani Nuclear Program”, Wilson Center, April 25,2012, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/new-documents-spotlight-reagan-era-tensions-over-pakistani-nuclear-program

xviii “Separatist movements and proxy wars,” The Adelphi Papers 33, no. 278(1993): 19-45, DOI: 10.1080/05679329308449172.

See also: Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Kashmir’s Secessionist Movement Resurfaces: Ethnic Identity, Community Competition, and the State,”Asian Survey 49, no. 6 (2009): 924-50, accessed November 29, 2020, doi:10.1525/as.2009.49.6.924,

ChidanandRajghatta, “Internationally, the Kashmir separatist movement is doomed by association with Pakistan,” The Economic Times, September 7, 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/internationally-the-kashmir-separatist-movement-is-doomed-by-association-with-pakistan/articleshow/54043879.cms?from=mdr

xix Seymour Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” New Yorker, March 29, 1993, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/1993/03/29/on-the-nuclear-edge.

xx Los Angeles Times, referred to by the Pakistani Urdu daily Nawa-e-Waqat, Rawalpindi, December 20, 1992

xxi Hersh, “On the Nuclear Edge,” New Yorker, March 29, 1993.

xxii Gupta, Kashmir: A study in India-Pakistan Relations, 302–7.

xxiii The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State in the Clinton administration Robin Raphel had questioned the validity of Kashmir’s ‘Instrument of Accession For Ms. Raphel’s remarks and India’s reactions, see India Abroad, November 5, 1993; and November 12, 1993; Times of India, October 30, 1993; October 31, 1993.

Suhasini Haidar, “Why does India say no to Kashmir mediation?” The Hindu, July 28, 2019 https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/why-does-india-say-no-to-kashmir-mediation/article28733048.ece

xxiv Stephen P. Cohen, “India and America: An Emerging Relationship”, A Paper Presented to the Conference on The Nation-State System and Transnational Forces in South Asia December 8-10, 2000, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/kyoto.pdf

xxv Indurthy, “The Turns and Shifts in the U. S. Role in the Kashmir Conflict since 1947,” 12

xxvi Ibid.

xxvii Admin CoolBen, “India and Pakistan on the Brink: The 1998 Nuclear Tests,” ADST, July 22, 2014, https://adst.org/2014/07/india-and-pakistan-on-the-brink-the-1998-nuclear-tests/
Also: Michael Krepon, “LOOKING BACK: The 1998 Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Tests”, Arms Control Today, accessed December 20, 2020 https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-06/looking-back-1998-indian-pakistani-nuclear-tests

xxviii Indurthy, 41.

xxix Ershad Mahmud, “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy.” Policy Perspectives 2, no. 1 (2005): 90-91, accessed December 20, 2020. http://www.jstor.org/stable/42909143

xxx “Nuclearisation of South Asia and the Kashmir Dispute,”Spotlight Regional Affairs, April 1999,103.
See also: Indurthy, 40-44.

xxxi Mahmud, “Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy,”  95

xxxii S. Rajagopalan, “Bush rules out US role in Kashmir,” The Hindustan Times, September 24, 2006, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india/bush-rules-out-us-role-in-kashmir/story-KKGZYYf4axTGqyR2Gn7YrN.html

xxxiii Ibid.

xxxiv Touqir Hussain, “Special Report: U.S.-Pakistan Engagement The War on Terrorism and Beyond”, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, Special Report 145, accessed December 20, 2020

https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/sr145.pdf

xxxv “U.S. Kashmir Policy in the Obama Administration and Beyond,” South Asia Journal, January 4, 2012, http://southasiajournal.net/u-s-kashmir-policy-in-the-obama-administration-and-beyond/

xxxvi “Brief on India-U.S. Relations”, Ministry of External Affairs, June 2017 https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_US_brief.pdf

xxxvii “U.S. Relations With India”, U.S. Department of State, June 21, 2017https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-india/

xxxviii Pant V. Harsh, “Pay no heed to Donald Trump’s gaffe over Kashmir issue,” ORF, July 25, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/pay-heed-donald-trumps-gaffe-kashmir-issue-53395/.

xxxix Ibid.

xl Paula Stern, “Unlocking US–India Trade: Why a Bilateral Technology Agreement Works for India and the United States,” Atlantic Council, February 1, 2018,https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep16815?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

xli “Surge in arms imports to Europe, while US dominance of the global arms trade increases,” SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, March 13, 2013, https://sipri.org/media/press-release/2023/surge-arms-imports-europe-while-us-dominance-global-arms-trade-increases

xlii Other than the BECA that has been signed recently, India and the US have signed General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) in 2002; Logistics Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016; and Communications Compatibility and Security Arrangement (COMCASA) in 2018. For a detailed account on the US-India strategic ties and possibilities see:
Sumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, Report. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019, 36-38, accessed December 13, 202o. doi:10.2307/resrep20080

&Adil Sultan, “India-US Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA),” Strafasia, October 28, 2020, https://cutt.ly/MjmTYxb

xliii China time and again failed to strike a balance between its diplomatic stand and military adventures against India. The changing Chinese stand on Kashmir has been largely driven by the position of India regarding Tibet and Xinxang (China’s strategic alliance with Pakistan has also become an important factor in this discussion). The 1962 China-India war let China claim itself as the stakeholder in the Kashmir issue. The military relations between China and Pakistan saw a major thrust after the 1965 war which was primarily to gain control of various strategically important positions. China also asked for a UN supervised plebiscite in Kashmir. In the 1980s China again went back to its old position on Kashmir calling it a bilateral dispute between India and Pakistan. After India tested its nuclear bombs in 1998, China once again demanded the UN intervention to resolve the Kashmir dispute blaming India for military tensions in South Asia. After the 2001 Indian parliament attack, China again asked for dialogue between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir Dispute and thus returned to the pre-1998 position. Though since the 1950s, China has been insisting on the bilateral nature of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. At times it has called for international mediation mainly to support Pakistan. It took the same position after the revocation of Art 370.

On August 16 2019, on Pakistan’s request China called for a closed door meeting of UNSC on Kashmir. See: Parjanya Bhatt, “Revisiting China’s Kashmir policy,” ORF, November 26, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/revisiting-chinas-kashmir-policy-58128/.

xliv William J. Burns, “The U.S.-India Relationship Is Bigger Than Trump and Modi” The Atlantic, February 22, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/modi-and-trumps-effect-us-india-partnership/606949/.

HARSH V. PANT AND YOGESH JOSHI, “Indo-US relations under Modi: the strategic logic underlying the embrace,” International Affairs 93, no. 1 (2017): 133–146, doi: 10.1093/ia/iiw028.
See also: Dhruva Jaishankar, “India and the united states in the trump era: re-evaluating bilateral and global relations foreign policy,” Brookings POLICY PAPER Number 37 June 2017, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep04410?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

xlv William J. Burns, “The U.S.-India Relationship Is Bigger Than Trump and Modi,” The Atlantic, February 22, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/02/modi-and-trumps-effect-us-india-partnership/606949/

xlvi Sana Hashmi, CSCAP REGIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK 2020. Report. Edited by Huisken Ron, Brett Kathryn, Milner Anthony, Smith Ric, Vermonte Philips, and Wanandi Jusuf. Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, 2019. 20-22, accessed January 13, 2021. doi:10.2307/resrep22261.7.

xlvii Sumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, Report. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2019, 36-38, accessed December 13, 202o. doi:10.2307/resrep20080

xlviii Sandeep Unnithan, “S-400: The geopolitical missile”, India Today, December 27, 2018,

https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20180813-s-400-the-geopolitical-missile-1303340-2018-08-06