Abstract:
This article examines BRICS as a political project emerging from dissatisfaction with Western-dominated global governance rather than as a conventional alliance or counter-hegemonic bloc. Drawing on institutional realism and constructivism, it analyses how unequal power, strategic autonomy, and reformist narratives shape cooperation among structurally asymmetric states, with particular attention to China’s dominance and India’s ambivalence. By situating BRICS within the longer history of South–South cooperation and tracing its recent expansion, the article argues that BRICS represents an ongoing experiment in plural world ordering—one constrained as much by internal asymmetries and geopolitical fragmentation as by its ambition to democratise global power.
BRICS did not emerge as a formal alliance, nor was it conceived as a challenge to the existing international system in the traditional sense. Its origins lie instead in a shared dissatisfaction among large emerging economies with a global order that no longer reflected shifting distributions of power. When the acronym was coined in the early 2000s, Brazil, Russia, India, and China were experiencing sustained economic growth, rising political confidence, and increasing global visibility. What brought them together was not ideological convergence, but a common perception that institutions of global governance remained disproportionately shaped by postwar Western dominance.
From a theoretical perspective, BRICS can best be understood through a blend of institutional realism and constructivism. Realist logic explains the impulse to coordinate in response to systemic imbalance, while constructivist insights illuminate how shared narratives of marginalisation and reformist ambition helped sustain cooperation among otherwise dissimilar states. BRICS is neither a balancing coalition nor a normative community. It is a pragmatic alignment designed to expand strategic autonomy, amplify collective voice, and gradually reshape the terms of participation in global governance.
The group’s evolution reflects this logic. Early BRIC meetings were modest and exploratory, focused on coordination in international financial institutions and macroeconomic dialogue. The inclusion of South Africa in 2010 added a deliberate political dimension, extending the grouping’s reach into Africa and reinforcing its claim to represent the Global South rather than merely fast-growing economies. Over time, BRICS leaders used summit diplomacy to signal dissatisfaction with existing institutions while avoiding direct confrontation. The establishment of the New Development Bank marked a qualitative shift, translating political intent into institutional form. Unlike the Bretton Woods institutions, the NDB was framed around principles of equality, local currency lending, and development responsiveness, even as it operated within the broader global financial system.
Leadership personalities played an important role in shaping this trajectory. Russia’s push for strategic multipolarity under Vladimir Putin aligned with China’s long-term vision of greater influence in global institutions under successive Chinese leaderships. India’s engagement has been more ambivalent, shaped by its tradition of strategic autonomy rooted in Jawaharlal Nehru’s non-aligned vision and recalibrated under Narendra Modi’s emphasis on multipolar engagement without formal alliances. India’s participation has grown more cautious since 2020, reflecting heightened bilateral tensions with China and a concurrent deepening of engagement with plurilateral frameworks such as the Indo-Pacific Quad—yet it retains BRICS membership as a channel for developmental cooperation and diplomatic leverage in multilateral settings. Brazil’s participation has oscillated with domestic political cycles, from activist diplomacy under Lula da Silva to periods of relative disengagement. South Africa, meanwhile, has consistently framed BRICS as a platform for development finance and South–South cooperation.
What distinguishes BRICS from regional organisations such as ASEAN is precisely this loose, non-binding character. ASEAN evolved through regional proximity, shared security concerns, and gradual norm building, culminating in dense institutionalisation. BRICS, by contrast, spans continents and strategic cultures. Its cohesion does not rest on regional interdependence or common security threats, but on selective convergence around reformist objectives. Where ASEAN privileges consensus and process, BRICS privileges flexibility and strategic ambiguity. This has allowed it to survive geopolitical shocks—like the New Development Bank pausing new Russia-related transactions in 2022 amid sanctions linked to the Ukraine conflict—though not without strain. Yet this same flexibility has limited the depth of integration. BRICS lacks the dense institutional mechanisms required for coordinated action in moments of crisis, reinforcing its role as a forum for alignment rather than an engine of collective enforcement.
At the same time, BRICS must be understood in historical context. Earlier efforts at South–South cooperation, from the Non-Aligned Movement to the Group of 77, were driven by political solidarity but constrained by limited economic capacity. BRICS differs in that its members command substantial economic weight, technological capability, and diplomatic reach. Together, they account for a significant share of global population, output, and trade. Yet unlike Cold War–era coalitions, BRICS does not seek to replace one bloc with another. Its ambition is quieter and more incremental: to widen the space for plural pathways to development and governance.
This ambition, however, is shaped by internal asymmetries that cannot be ignored. Despite rhetoric of equality, China’s structural weight within BRICS is unmistakable. China contributes the largest share of the group’s combined GDP, dominates manufacturing and trade flows, and exerts considerable influence over institutional initiatives, including the New Development Bank. This imbalance does not manifest as formal hierarchy, but it conditions internal dynamics. For India, Brazil, and South Africa, participation in BRICS serves a dual purpose: collective bargaining with Western-dominated institutions and strategic hedging against excessive Chinese dominance. As a result, cooperation is carefully calibrated. Institutional deepening proceeds cautiously, consensus is tightly managed, and flexibility is preserved as a safeguard against internal imbalance.
This tension helps explain BRICS’ preference for incrementalism over formalisation. The grouping has expanded its agenda to include health cooperation, education, technology, and development finance, and more recently, concrete explorations of local currency trade mechanisms and alternative payment systems as complements to existing global financial infrastructure. Yet it has resisted binding commitments or supranational authority. Its strength lies in agenda setting and coordination rather than enforcement. This makes BRICS resilient but also limits its capacity to act decisively in moments of crisis.
Looking ahead, BRICS stands at a crossroads rather than on a linear trajectory. One possible path is institutional deepening, where existing mechanisms such as the New Development Bank, local currency trade arrangements, and coordinated positions in global forums mature into a more coherent alternative architecture. A second scenario is functional stagnation, in which BRICS remains a prominent diplomatic platform but delivers limited outcomes beyond periodic coordination and symbolic dissent. A third trajectory—now unfolding in real time—is fragmentation through expansion. Following the landmark Johannesburg Summit in August 2023, five new members—Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—formally acceded to BRICS on 1 January 2024. Argentina, initially invited, withdrew its accession in December 2023. While this expansion significantly enhances BRICS’ representational scope across Africa, West Asia, and the Arab world, it also introduces new layers of complexity: divergent geopolitical alignments, competing regional ambitions, and asymmetric security postures—notably between Iran and the Gulf states. Managing this enlarged configuration will test whether the grouping’s hallmark flexibility can accommodate multipolarity within itself, or whether centrifugal forces will dilute its strategic coherence.
BRICS is therefore best understood not as a rival bloc to the West, nor as a transient coalition of convenience, but as a negotiated space shaped by shared dissatisfaction, unequal capabilities, and divergent national trajectories. Its evolution reflects the broader condition of the emerging world: impatient with inherited hierarchies, wary of new forms of dominance, and still searching for institutional forms that reconcile ambition with diversity. Whether BRICS ultimately reshapes global governance or merely reshuffles diplomatic alignments will depend less on declarations and more on its ability to manage asymmetry without hierarchy, plurality without paralysis, and expansion without fragmentation.
In that sense, BRICS is not just an institution in the making. It is an ongoing experiment in how power, cooperation, and legitimacy are negotiated in a world no longer defined by a single centre.