Abstract:
India’s simultaneous engagement with Iran and Israel reveals not coherence but a long history of strategic equivocation. This article traces how domestic pressures, global realignments, and ideological shifts have shaped India’s contradictory posture toward two rival states. As great-power tensions intensify, India’s balancing act appears increasingly brittle and unsustainable.
1. Nehruvian Moralism and Postcolonial Priorities (1947–1979)
In the early decades after independence, India’s foreign policy was guided by Nehruvian ideals of non-alignment, anti-colonial solidarity, and moral diplomacy. While India formally recognized Israel in 1950, it withheld full diplomatic ties, citing solidarity with Palestine, dependence on Arab oil, and sensitivity to its domestic Muslim population. India consistently condemned Israeli occupation policies and voted against it in the United Nations, aligning itself with the Arab bloc and the Non-Aligned Movement.
During the same period, India maintained cordial relations with Iran under the pro-Western Shah. Though Iran was aligned with the U.S. through CENTO, it shared civilizational ties and trade interests with India, especially in the oil sector. However, the India-Iran relationship remained limited in scope, shaped more by economic necessity than strategic trust, and constrained by India’s deepening ties with the Soviet Union.
2. Revolution, Insurgency, and the Emergence of Quiet Diplomacy (1979–1991)
The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran disrupted regional equations. The new Islamic Republic, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, espoused anti-Western and pan-Islamist rhetoric that made India cautious, especially given rising militancy in Kashmir and India’s secular framework. Yet New Delhi opted for continued engagement. During the Iran‑Iraq War (1980–88), India maintained an official policy of neutrality. India supported UN‑led peace efforts and discouraged the use of chemical weapons—a stance reflecting disapproval of such violence in multilateral forums. While India historically opposed excessive great‑power naval influence in the Indian Ocean, this was part of its broader non‑aligned posture, not a targeted siding with Iran.
Meanwhile, During the 1980s, as Punjab faced insurgency, India’s RAW quietly deepened its intelligence collaboration with Mossad—for instance, in training India’s Special Group commandos in Israel. India’s IB and RAW also issued warnings ahead of the 1985 Kanishka tragedy, though there is no public evidence of Israeli involvement in that specific investigation. Meanwhile, India carefully kept these defense and intelligence ties unofficial, upholding a pro-Palestine posture in international forums.
3. Economic Crisis and Diplomatic Realignment (1991–2005)
India’s 1991 economic crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union prompted a major strategic shift. Under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, India recognized Israel with full diplomatic ties in January 1992—a move aimed at diversifying foreign relations and enhancing access to Western technology. Israel soon became a valued partner, supplying defense systems, surveillance drones, and agricultural innovations. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, Israel expedited deliveries of precision-guided munitions, UAVs, and ammunition, reinforcing its emerging role as a key strategic ally—albeit through discreet, non-public channels.
At the same time, India deepened engagement with post‑war Iran under Presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami, viewing it as a vital gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia. The 2003‑proposed Chabahar project, formalized with trilateral MoUs, was conceived partly to offset Gwadar. However, India’s IAEA votes in 2005 and 2006—against Iran’s nuclear program and under U.S. influence during civil‑nuclear deal talks—sparked diplomatic outrage in Tehran, establishing a persistent trust deficit.
4. Strategic Partnerships and Domestic Polarities (2005–2020)
India’s ties with Israel became both institutional and ideological under the UPA and Modi governments. High-level visits, joint military development (such as the Barak-8 missile system), and robust cybersecurity cooperation made Israel a top-tier defense partner. Prime Minister Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, notably uncoupled from a Palestine visit, marked a visible break from past protocol and a bold new alignment.
Domestically, this dovetailed with the rise of Hindutva politics. The Hindu right increasingly admired Israel’s muscular nationalism and its aggressive military posture. Israeli flags appeared at BJP rallies, and right-wing commentators framed Israel as a model for India’s handling of internal insurgencies and border threats. Conversely, India’s Muslims and progressive communities continued to mobilize around Iran and the Palestinian cause, particularly during the 2014 and 2021 Israeli bombardments of Gaza. Protests and rallies in Indian cities like Lucknow, Hyderabad, and Delhi revealed the depth of these transnational solidarities.
As India’s defense and intelligence ties with Israel strengthened, its strategic relationship with Iran cooled. Following U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of sanctions in May 2018, India lost its waiver by mid-2019 and ceased Iranian oil imports. Consequently, key initiatives such as the Chabahar development and rail links slowed, provoking Iranian displeasure. Tehran publicly criticized India for compromising autonomy under U.S. pressure, expressing dismay at Delhi’s strategic realignment.
5. Strategic Drift in the New Cold War (2020–2025)
In today’s geopolitical context—shaped by China’s resurgence, U.S.–Iran tensions, and realigned West Asian partnerships—India’s strategic balancing act has grown more precarious. The Abraham Accords further sidelined Iran, legitimizing Israel’s integration with Gulf Arab states. India’s measured silence during Israel’s Gaza operations in 2021 and again in 2023—evident in its abstention from key UN resolutions—sent a clear signal. These decisions were welcomed by Tel Aviv, though India maintained the position that its votes stemmed from terrorism concerns and routine principles. Tehran, meanwhile, expressed unease at what it perceived as Delhi’s strategic realignment.
As India improved its security and economic ties with Israel, Iran responded by deepening partnerships with China and Pakistan—viewing India’s relative withdrawal as strategic abandonment. Iranian media and officials accused India of betraying Palestine and succumbing to Zionist and imperialist pressures. Nevertheless, by 2024–25, India quietly re-engaged with Iran—concluding a ten-year Chabahar port deal in May 2024 and endorsing Iran’s inclusion in BRICS+—moves motivated not by ideological alignment, but by a need to counter Chinese regional dominance and preserve connectivity to Central Asia.
Despite recent engagement, trust between India and Iran remains limited—Tehran stays cautious even as India quietly revives Chabahar and backs Iran’s inclusion in BRICS+. Conversely, Israel has evolved into a cornerstone partner in India’s military-industrial complex. India now navigates its global posture through pragmatism and ambiguity, striving to sidestep hard strategic choices. But in a world that demands clarity, such a posture may be increasingly unsustainable.
Conclusion: Strategic Equivocation or Eroding Autonomy?
India’s foreign policy toward Iran and Israel exemplifies its broader transition from non-aligned idealism to multi-aligned realism. What was once considered diplomatic flexibility now resembles strategic equivocation. India partners with Israel on security, innovation, and arms development, while engaging Iran for energy access, geopolitical routes, and counter-China balancing. Yet neither relationship is fully trusted or ideologically consistent.
India’s abstentions on Palestine-related UN votes, its silence during major Israeli offensives, and and its compliance with U.S. sanctions has led Iran to question India’s strategic independence. Meanwhile, Israel seeks deeper alignment, pushing India further into a U.S.-Israel-Gulf axis that sits uneasily with its BRICS rhetoric.
At home, the foreign policy split reflects internal ideological cleavages. Hindutva factions embrace Israel, while India’s Muslim communities and leftist voices continue to identify with Iran and the Palestinian struggle. These tensions are no longer merely symbolic—they shape protest movements, identity politics, and public opinion.
As global polarizations intensify, India’s attempt to walk both sides of the Iran-Israel divide risks becoming unsustainable. What was once a model of strategic autonomy may now be a slow erosion of credibility. India is not choosing sides—but in doing so, it may be losing its center, or so it seems!