The Shadow War in Balochistan

The strategic crucible of Balochistan

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest yet most underdeveloped province, has long served as a geopolitical flashpoint. Rich in natural resources but mired in chronic poverty, military repression, and ethno-nationalist alienation, it has become fertile ground for a complex entanglement of insurgencies and international security threats. While Baloch ethno-nationalist movements like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Liberation Front (BLF) have historically pursued a secular agenda of self-determination and independence from Islamabad, the region’s security landscape has grown increasingly convoluted with the entrance of transnational jihadist groups—most notably, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

The convergence and conflict between these movements—each animated by contrasting ideological, operational, and strategic logics—have profound implications not only for Pakistan’s internal stability but also for regional geopolitics, particularly in light of the alleged role of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI, in managing or manipulating these dynamics.

ISKP in Balochistan: Transnational jihad in a nationalist stronghold

ISKP, the South-Central Asian affiliate of the so-called Islamic State, formally emerged in Balochistan around 2016–2017, building upon existing jihadist networks and recruiting disillusioned militants from groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). The group’s presence has been most pronounced in and around Quetta, Mastung, and Turbat, regions already under securitized pressure due to both ethnic insurgency and sectarian violence. Unlike the BLA and BLF, ISKP sees Balochistan as a launching pad for a broader pan-Islamist caliphate rather than a site of ethnic liberation.

Their tactics have mirrored this ideological divergence: ISKP has targeted Hazara Shias, polio workers, and Pakistani security forces, rather than focusing on infrastructure or state extraction sites that Baloch insurgents typically attack. The 2017 Quetta shrine bombing and repeated massacres of Hazara civilians underscore the group’s sectarian agenda. Importantly, ISKP has leveraged cross-border sanctuaries and porous frontiers with Afghanistan to bolster its operations, with some evidence of tactical coordination with regional Salafi jihadist outfits, though no solid ideological fusion has emerged.

BLA and BLF: Ethno-nationalist insurgencies against a centralized state

The BLA and the BLF are the two most prominent armed nationalist groups fighting for Balochistan’s independence. While both have fragmented over time, they remain relatively coherent in their ideological aims: resisting what they view as Pakistan’s colonial-style exploitation of Baloch resources and demography. The state’s development of CPEC infrastructure, its control over the mineral-rich Saindak and Reko Diq projects, and the deployment of paramilitary forces have been central targets of their resistance.

Unlike jihadist groups, the BLA and BLF project a secular-nationalist narrative. Their enemy is not a global civilizational foe but the centralized Pakistani state. Recent attacks such as the BLA-led assault on the Karachi Stock Exchange in 2020 and the BLF’s sabotage of gas pipelines illustrate their strategic targeting of economic infrastructure rather than sectarian civilians. In their communiqués, both groups have condemned religious extremism and framed themselves as indigenous liberation forces fighting an occupying power.

Ideological divergence and tactical coexistence

While there are occasional overlaps in geography and enemy targets, BLA, BLF, and ISKP do not represent a coherent militant bloc. Their ideological contradictions are stark: the ethno-nationalist groups view themselves as secular defenders of Baloch identity, while ISKP seeks to obliterate all subnational affiliations in favor of an Islamist ummah. The potential for cooperation is limited, and reports of direct collaboration remain unverified and sparse.

In fact, ISKP’s presence often undermines Baloch nationalist movements by complicating their image abroad and offering the Pakistani state a justification for heavy-handed military operations. By framing all insurgents as part of the broader “terrorist threat,” Islamabad blurs the line between nationalist grievances and jihadist violence. This tactical convergence—where distinct groups attack a shared adversary but for very different reasons—has led to operational chaos in some regions but no evidence of strategic alliance.

The ISI and the architecture of manipulation

The role of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in this complex matrix is one of the most contentious yet central issues. Critics and exiled Baloch leaders have long alleged that the ISI has manipulated sectarian and jihadist groups, including allowing ISKP to grow, as a counterbalance to secular nationalist insurgencies. While direct evidence is scarce due to the covert nature of intelligence operations, patterns suggest that selective tolerance or tactical redeployment of jihadist actors in Balochistan may serve state interests in diffusing nationalist momentum.

Some analysts argue that the ISI’s historical relationship with Salafi-jihadist groups—cultivated during the Afghan jihad era—has not entirely been severed. By diverting international attention to ISKP’s actions, the Pakistani state can present itself as a victim of global terrorism while continuing repressive operations against Baloch nationalists. Moreover, ISKP’s violent sectarianism offers Islamabad a dual-purpose tool: the undermining of Shia communities and the strategic dilution of Baloch grievances under the broader umbrella of counterterrorism.

Geopolitical Implications and Regional Spill-overs

Balochistan’s turmoil cannot be confined within Pakistan’s borders. The province shares deep historical, tribal, and smuggling routes with Iran’s Sistan-Baluchestan province, a region also plagued by Sunni extremism. Iranian authorities have frequently expressed concern over cross-border infiltration by jihadist groups, and have increased border militarization as a result. Additionally, reports have emerged suggesting that ISKP elements use these porous borders to shuttle fighters, launder money, and purchase arms.

India, too, has been drawn into this regional equation. Pakistan routinely accuses India of supporting Baloch insurgents through covert channels, while India denies such involvement but has consistently raised concerns over human rights violations in Balochistan. China, the biggest economic stakeholder in the region through CPEC, finds itself increasingly vulnerable. ISKP and BLA have both targeted Chinese engineers and infrastructure, interpreting Beijing’s presence as neocolonial extraction.

Thus, Balochistan is not merely a provincial problem—it is a regional flashpoint with implications for Iran-Pakistan relations, India-Pakistan tensions, and China’s Belt and Road ambitions.

The actions of the ISKP

The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the South Asian affiliate of ISIS, has been increasingly active in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, where it has carried out a series of high-profile attacks aimed at destabilizing the region. Among its most notorious operations was the 2025 Mastung bus bombing, in which an improvised explosive device (IED) targeted a police vehicle, killing three personnel and injuring at least 20 others. ISKP swiftly claimed responsibility for the blast. Similarly, in March 2023, a suicide bombing in Bolan killed nine police officers and injured more than a dozen, further underscoring the group’s intent to strike at state security institutions.

ISKP has also engaged in brutal sectarian violence. One of the most chilling examples was the January 2021 Machh massacre, where 11 Hazara coal miners were abducted and murdered in a gruesome fashion. The victims were blindfolded and had their throats slit—a tactic meant to terrorize and marginalize the Shi’a Hazara community. This sectarian targeting is a consistent pattern in ISKP’s actions, which include the August 2022 armed assault on a Christian gathering in Mastung that resulted in several fatalities.

In addition to mass attacks, ISKP has conducted targeted assassinations. In July 2023, suspected ISKP operatives assassinated government journalist Mohammed Khan Sassoli in Kaushik District. Just a month later, in August 2023, the group killed a member of Pakistan’s Counter Terrorism Force in the Kank area of Mastung. Such incidents point to a broader campaign of undermining both state institutions and civil society actors.

Beyond individual attacks, ISKP has reportedly developed a more permanent presence in Balochistan. Intelligence and investigative reports suggest the group has established operational infrastructure, including training camps, and is recruiting fighters not only locally but also from Central Asia. Its collaboration with local sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi has further strengthened its capacity to strike with precision and brutality.

In sum, ISKP’s activities in Balochistan reflect a deliberate strategy to destabilize the province through high-casualty attacks, sectarian violence, and the assassination of state and civil figures. Its growing footprint and partnerships with other extremist groups present a serious challenge to Pakistan’s internal security and the broader regional stability.

Islamist terrorism in a Muslim region

Despite being a Muslim-majority region, Balochistan has increasingly become a target for the ISKP. This apparent contradiction—of jihadist violence in a land where Islam is already dominant—can be understood by examining ISKP’s ideological framework, strategic interests, and the local political context. For ISKP, the religious identity of a population is not enough; only those who conform to their rigid, ultra-extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam are deemed legitimate. Everyone else—including Shi’a Muslims, Sunni Muslims aligned with the state, and even democratic participants—is labelled an apostate or heretic.

At the heart of ISKP’s actions is a Takfiri ideology, which permits the excommunication and killing of other Muslims based on their beliefs or behaviors. The Hazara community in Balochistan, predominantly Shi’a, has been particularly vulnerable to ISKP’s sectarian violence. Massacres like the 2021 Machh attack, where 11 Hazara coal miners were brutally killed, highlight how ISKP uses religious identity as a weapon to instill fear and project ideological purity. But even Sunni Muslims who serve in the police, military, or government are not spared, as they are seen as collaborators with a state ISKP considers un-Islamic.

Strategically, Balochistan is attractive to ISKP for several reasons. The province borders Afghanistan and Iran, providing access to cross-border smuggling routes, potential recruits, and operational depth. Its vast, mountainous terrain also makes it difficult for the Pakistani state to maintain full control, giving militant groups space to operate. Moreover, Balochistan’s long-standing political instability, economic neglect, and simmering separatist movement create fertile ground for insurgent groups to exploit. By capitalizing on local grievances and mistrust of the central government, ISKP attempts to embed itself within the region’s fractured landscape.

ISKP also uses its activities in Balochistan for symbolic and propaganda purposes. Attacking security forces and vulnerable communities allows the group to generate global headlines and bolster its image as a potent jihadist force. Such attacks are often accompanied by propaganda videos and claims of responsibility released through affiliated media outlets like Amaq News. These are intended not only to inspire followers abroad but also to position ISKP as the most ideologically committed and militarily capable actor among various militant factions operating in the region.

Additionally, ISKP’s aggression in Balochistan is part of a broader competition and collaboration with other Islamist groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and local Baloch insurgents. In an environment crowded with violent actors, ISKP seeks to distinguish itself through high-profile, brutal attacks that demonstrate its reach and ruthlessness. By asserting dominance over both local populations and rival groups, ISKP hopes to expand its influence and secure its place in the wider jihadist movement.

In summary, ISKP’s campaign in Balochistan is not an aberration but a calculated strategy rooted in extremist ideology and opportunistic politics. Its violence serves multiple aims: to enforce religious conformity, destabilize the Pakistani state, exploit regional chaos, and assert itself in the competitive militant landscape. That Balochistan is Muslim-majority is irrelevant to ISKP—in their worldview, only their version of Islam is valid, and all others are enemies.

Conclusion: A theatre of layered insurgencies

Balochistan remains a site where multiple insurgencies intersect, not in cooperation but in conflict and contradiction. The presence of ISKP has internationalized what was once a regional struggle, allowing the Pakistani state to blur narratives of separatism and terrorism. The BLA and BLF, despite their fragmentation, continue to articulate a nationalist cause rooted in economic marginalization and political alienation. ISKP, on the other hand, seeks to impose a transnational Islamist regime divorced from local identities.

The Pakistani state, particularly the ISI, stands at the center of this entangled landscape—sometimes as combatant, sometimes as manipulator. Whether Balochistan evolves into a battleground of clashing ideologies or a site for negotiated settlement depends not only on counterinsurgency but on political recognition of the structural violence and disenfranchisement at its core.