A State of Strategic Hostility: Terrorism as the Grammar of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy

Partitioned Foundations and a State Built on Siege (1947–1958)

From day one, Pakistan saw survival through the lens of conflict, not coexistence.

The state of Pakistan did not simply emerge from the trauma of Partition — it was born out of an ideological project premised on religious exclusivism and political negation. Its founding narrative, crafted by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the Muslim League, was not one of coexistence or pluralistic aspiration, but of permanent separation. The two-nation theory¹ — the ideological cornerstone of Pakistan’s creation — asserted that Hindus and Muslims were not just followers of different faiths but belonged to fundamentally distinct civilizations, incapable of sharing a common political future. This theory, shaped more by the political calculations of colonial-era elites than by the lived reality of Indian Muslims, sought to consolidate religious identity into a sovereign political entity. In doing so, it conflated faith with nationhood and difference with irreconcilability.

Yet, in a moment of striking contradiction, Jinnah’s speech to the Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947, seemed to walk back the very ideological scaffolding that had made Pakistan possible². He declared, “You may belong to any religion or caste or creed — that has nothing to do with the business of the state.” This liberal, secular note — suggesting the separation of religion from politics — came too late and stood in sharp tension with the communal logic of partition he had so vigorously championed. By then, the ideological genie was out of the bottle. Pakistan’s political DNA had already been encoded with a majoritarian impulse, and Jinnah’s invocation of secular principles appeared more as damage control amid unfolding communal violence than a genuine reorientation of the state’s founding ethos.

Unlike India’s post-independence project, which, despite its contradictions, attempted to construct a secular, multi-religious democratic state, Pakistan’s founding vision was built around a majoritarian identity masquerading as a safeguard for minority rights. The early leadership, lacking a coherent plan for state-building beyond separation, resorted to invoking perpetual external threat, particularly from India, as a means of internal cohesion. The nascent Pakistani state quickly adopted a siege mentality, in which national survival was seen not through development or democratic consensus, but through vigilance against imagined and real enemies.

This foundational insecurity was not incidental — it was structurally embedded. The political vacuum left by weak civilian institutions was rapidly filled by the military-bureaucratic elite, who saw in the ideology of the opposition a convenient justification for centralization, militarization, and ideological control. As a result, Pakistan’s identity did not evolve organically through the negotiation of diversity, but was rigidly engineered around the politics of fear, grievance, and exclusion — an identity that continues to haunt its domestic politics and regional conduct to this day.

The dispute over Kashmir³, ignited immediately after independence, was more than a territorial contest — it was a test of the two-nation theory. The 1947–48 tribal invasion of Kashmir, orchestrated with logistical and moral support from the Pakistani state, was the first sign of what would become an entrenched pattern: using irregular fighters to pursue state objectives while denying formal involvement.

This foundational period also saw the early consolidation of the Pakistan Army as the dominant national institution. While politicians struggled to define the state’s democratic contours, the military perceived itself as the true guardian of national survival. From the very beginning, the army and its intelligence wing saw asymmetric warfare as an essential equalizer in the face of India’s conventional superiority. The emerging national security doctrine began to blur the lines between civilian and military spheres and between statecraft and subversion. This structural logic — born of insecurity and hostility — would shape Pakistan’s strategic decisions for decades to come.

Doctrinal Crystallization Through Military Rule (1958–1977)

After losing on the battlefield, the generals chose to fight through shadows.

The 1958 military coup institutionalized the security state. Field Marshal Ayub Khan’s assumption of power marked not just the militarization of politics, but the professionalization of a particular worldview: Pakistan as a perennial victim of Indian hegemony and Western neglect. Foreign policy, especially vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan, was placed firmly under military control. The political class was sidelined, and diplomacy became subservient to strategic imperatives formulated in Rawalpindi, not Islamabad.

Operation Gibraltar in 1965⁴, designed and executed by the Pakistan Army, was the first large-scale use of militant proxies⁵ to instigate an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. The plan relied on the assumption that Kashmiri Muslims would rise up against Indian rule if given the spark. That calculation proved disastrously wrong, but its strategic premise — that irregular fighters could serve as the tip of the spear — remained unshaken.

After the devastating loss of East Pakistan in 1971, the military’s conviction in proxy warfare only intensified. The humiliation of surrender did not lead to strategic introspection. Instead, it created a doctrinal shift: from conventional parity to asymmetric retaliation. The defeat was interpreted not as a failure of militarism but of insufficient militancy. The military believed it needed better tools, not a better strategy. This institutional learning set the stage for an even more dangerous phase: the formal incorporation of jihad into foreign policy.

Militant Proxies Become Core Strategic Assets (1977–1988)

Militancy became foreign policy in camouflage.

General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime marked the full synthesis of ideological and strategic jihad. Internally, the state sponsored widespread Islamization⁶—rewriting textbooks, reshaping law, and embedding clerical influence into governance. Externally, Pakistan transformed from a regional power to a global player in the Cold War through its role in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)⁷ expanded dramatically, becoming both the logistical heart and ideological brain behind the militant networks that would later mutate into transnational terrorist organizations.

These groups were not rogue elements; they were carefully cultivated as strategic assets. Training camps were established with state approval. Arms and funds flowed in from both the CIA and Saudi Arabia, but the direction, recruitment, and long-term indoctrination were managed locally. This infrastructure was dual-use: the same fighters trained to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan were later redeployed to Kashmir and India.

During this time, Pakistan developed what would become its enduring doctrine of “strategic depth” — the belief that a friendly or pliable regime in Afghanistan was essential for military security against India. Militant Islamist groups thus became geopolitical instruments. They were not liabilities to be controlled but assets to be wielded. The normalization of proxy warfare during this period ensured that terrorism was not a tactical aberration, but a built-in feature of statecraft.

Proxy War Doctrine Reaches Maturity (1988–1999)

Terror became the preferred instrument of diplomacy.

Following Zia’s death, Pakistan returned to nominal civilian rule, but the military retained its grip over national security, foreign policy, and nuclear strategy. The ISI’s proxy networks remained untouched — in fact, they flourished. Groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba⁸ and Jaish-e-Mohammed⁹ expanded their reach under state patronage, operating with impunity across borders while maintaining logistical bases inside Pakistan. The proxy war in Kashmir intensified in the 1990s, with the Pakistani establishment using these groups to bleed India by a thousand cuts.

Despite international condemnation, the state made a cold calculation: as long as these groups did not target Pakistani interests directly, they were useful tools of coercion and deterrence. The Kargil War in 1999¹⁰ was a logical continuation of this strategy. Disguised soldiers and jihadists infiltrated Indian positions, seeking to internationalize the Kashmir issue and redraw the Line of Control by force. The operation failed strategically and diplomatically, but it affirmed an important military belief — that irregular war was more viable and less costly than conventional engagement.

In the eyes of the Pakistani military, terrorism was no longer a contingency plan. It had become a permanent layer of diplomacy — a silent negotiator at the table of international politics, uninvited yet undeniably present.

Post-9/11: A Two-Faced Statecraft (2001–2010)

Ally by day, arsonist by night.

The attacks of September 11, 2001 presented Pakistan with both a crisis and an opportunity. Under immense U.S. pressure, it joined the war on terror. Billions in military and economic aid flowed into the country. But while publicly aligning with the U.S., Pakistan quietly preserved its strategic asset base. Groups targeting Indian and Afghan interests were shielded under the convenient distinction of “good” vs. “bad” militants — a division created not on ideological lines, but on strategic usefulness.

While Pakistan helped capture some high-profile al-Qaeda figures, it allowed Afghan Taliban leaders and the Haqqani Network¹¹ to operate from its territory with minimal interference. Similarly, anti-India groups continued recruitment and training under different guises. The 2008 Mumbai attacks, meticulously planned and executed by a group operating from Pakistani soil, shattered any illusion of a full Pakistani pivot. Internationally, Pakistan condemned the violence. Domestically, it hesitated to act decisively, shielding perpetrators and denying institutional complicity.

The post-9/11 decade was thus defined by strategic duplicity. Pakistan positioned itself as a victim of terrorism to receive global support while remaining an incubator for transnational jihadist groups that served its regional ambitions.

Blowback and the Crisis of Control (2010–Present)

The monster bred for war now stalks its maker.

By the 2010s, the contradictions of Pakistan’s strategy became increasingly unmanageable. Factions that were once patronized — particularly those operating in the tribal belt — turned against the state. The Pakistani Taliban began targeting military installations and public spaces, while Baloch insurgents escalated their campaign for autonomy. The military launched major operations to contain the violence, but these were selective and reactive rather than systemic.

Even as the state declared victory over “terrorism,” it preserved the deeper architecture of proxy warfare. Groups attacking India and operating in Afghanistan continued to receive tacit or direct support. The fall of Kabul in 2021, enabled by Taliban advances long nurtured by Pakistani intelligence, seemed like a strategic win. But the victory was short-lived. The new regime proved unpredictable, even hostile. Border tensions increased. Cross-border attacks on Pakistani forces intensified. The fire that had been directed outward was now burning inward.

International pressure, particularly from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)¹², forced cosmetic reforms and superficial bans. Yet the ideological and logistical infrastructure of militancy — the madrasa networks¹³, the political parties with militant wings, the radicalized segments of the military — remained largely intact. Pakistan today finds itself locked in a feedback loop of its own design: it cannot dismantle the militant ecosystem without destabilizing the very structure it relies on for regional leverage.

Conclusion: Terrorism as a Structural Doctrine

This is not state failure — it is state design.

The use of terrorism in Pakistan’s foreign policy is not a byproduct of weak governance or isolated miscalculations. It is a product of coherent, sustained, and deeply institutionalized choices made by the state’s most powerful actors — primarily the military and intelligence establishment.

Over seven decades, Pakistan has developed a parallel foreign policy apparatus rooted in coercion, subversion, and plausible deniability. The reliance on armed non-state actors is not tactical improvisation; it is strategic continuity. Proxy groups have allowed Pakistan to punch above its weight, bleed adversaries, influence neighboring regimes, and maintain domestic cohesion under the guise of external threat.

But this Faustian bargain is collapsing. The costs — diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and internal radicalization — are beginning to outweigh the benefits. Yet the doctrine endures because it is embedded not just in policy, but in institutional identity.

Until Pakistan fundamentally reimagines its national security paradigm — abandoning militancy as method, not merely rhetoric — terrorism will remain its most enduring and tragic export.

1. Two-Nation Theory: A founding ideology of Pakistan that posits Muslims and Hindus in British India as two distinct nations due to religious, cultural, and social differences, necessitating separate states. ↩︎
2. Partition of India (1947): The division of British India into two independent dominions—India and Pakistan—based largely on religious lines, resulting in widespread communal violence and mass migrations. ↩︎
3. Kashmir Dispute: A territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over the region of Jammu and Kashmir, which has led to multiple wars and ongoing tensions since independence in 1947. ↩︎
4. Operation Gibraltar (1965): A covert military operation by Pakistan aimed at infiltrating forces into Indian-administered Kashmir to incite an insurgency, which ultimately failed and led to the 1965 Indo-Pak War. ↩︎
5. Militant proxies: Non-state armed groups supported by a state to achieve strategic goals without direct involvement, often used by Pakistan against India and in Afghanistan. ↩︎
6. Islamization under General Zia-ul-Haq: The process of aligning Pakistani laws and society with a strict interpretation of Islamic principles, initiated during Zia’s dictatorship (1977–1988), significantly influencing national identity and politics. ↩︎
7. Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI): Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, known for its role in shaping regional security policy and supporting militant groups during conflicts with India and in Afghanistan. ↩︎
8. Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT): A Pakistan-based militant group responsible for numerous terrorist attacks in India, including the 2008 Mumbai attacks, widely believed to have received past support from elements within the ISI. ↩︎
9. Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): Another Pakistan-based militant organization targeting India; founded by Masood Azhar, it has been implicated in major attacks and is considered a terrorist group by the United Nations and other international bodies. ↩︎
10. Kargil War (1999): A military conflict between India and Pakistan in the Kargil district of Kashmir, triggered by Pakistani troops and militants crossing the Line of Control, leading to a limited but intense war. ↩︎
11. Haqqani Network: A militant group based in Afghanistan with strong ties to the Taliban and elements within Pakistan’s ISI; active in cross-border attacks and insurgent activities. ↩︎
12. Financial Action Task Force (FATF): An intergovernmental body that sets standards and promotes policies to combat money laundering, terrorist financing, and related threats to the integrity of the global financial system. ↩︎
13. Madrasas: Islamic seminaries prevalent across Pakistan that provide religious education; some have been criticized for promoting extremist ideologies and recruiting for militant causes. ↩︎