India, Pakistan, and China are locked in a high-stakes strategic rivalry centered on Kashmir, shaped by decades of war, proxy militancy, and nuclear brinkmanship. This article traces the conflict’s evolution and China’s growing influence through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and regional alignments. In a multipolar world, South Asia’s future hinges not on peace declarations, but on reimagining its strategic foundations.
Introduction: The Kashmir Conflict and Regional Rivalries
The India-Pakistan rivalry, centered on the Kashmir dispute, is one of the longest-standing and most significant conflicts in modern history. Since the partition of British India in 1947, the two countries have been in a bitter contest for regional supremacy, with Kashmir serving as the focal point of their animosity. The strategic stakes are incredibly high for both nations, with Pakistan viewing Kashmir as a matter of territorial integrity, and India considering the dispute crucial to its sovereignty and national unity. Over the decades, this rivalry has been marked by several key military confrontations, shifting leadership dynamics, and external influences.
China’s role in the India-Pakistan rivalry has become increasingly significant, adding another layer of complexity. Initially, China was focused on its internal issues, but over time, its strategic partnership with Pakistan evolved into one of the most consequential alliances in South Asia. China’s growing influence in the region, coupled with its territorial disputes with India, has further complicated the already volatile conflict. This article traces the evolution of the India-Pakistan rivalry, explores China’s growing involvement, and examines the strategic decisions made by key leaders that have shaped the region’s geopolitics.
The Early Years and the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947–1948)
The partition of British India in 1947 was the first flashpoint between India and Pakistan. The princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a Muslim-majority population but a Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, became the epicenter of the dispute. Both India and Pakistan laid claim to Kashmir, and the situation escalated when tribal forces, supported by Pakistan and directed under the leadership of Pakistan’s first Governor-General Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, invaded the state.
In response, Maharaja Hari Singh sought military assistance from India, signing the Instrument of Accession in October 1947, which formally brought Kashmir under Indian control. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, after consultation with Governor-General Lord Mountbatten, committed troops to repel the invasion. India’s immediate military intervention led to the First Indo-Pakistani War (1947–1948). The war reached a stalemate after intense fighting, and the United Nations, pushed by figures such as UN representative Sir Owen Dixon, brokered a ceasefire in January 1949. This led to the establishment of the Line of Control (LoC), dividing Kashmir between India and Pakistan.
During this early period, China under Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai remained internally focused on consolidating Communist power after the Chinese Civil War. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin had limited involvement, focusing more on ideological consolidation in Eastern Europe.
The Sino-Indian War and Its Impact on the India-Pakistan Dynamic (1962)
By the early 1960s, the geopolitical landscape in South Asia began to shift. The Sino-Indian War of 1962, triggered by a border dispute over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, had profound implications. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s insistence on control over Aksai Chin, an area vital for China’s access between Xinjiang and Tibet, collided with Nehru’s assertion of Indian sovereignty, informed by the newly drawn McMahon Line.
China’s People’s Liberation Army launched a well-coordinated offensive that overwhelmed India’s ill-prepared forces, exposing gaps in Indian military preparedness and strategic planning. Prime Minister Nehru, facing a domestic backlash, appealed to the United States and the Soviet Union for assistance. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, while maintaining a cautious neutrality, chose to strengthen India’s military capabilities in the years following the war.
Pakistan, under the leadership of President Ayub Khan, saw India’s defeat as a strategic opportunity. Pakistan signed the Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement in 1963, ceding parts of the Shaksgam Valley to China. This agreement laid the foundation for a durable Sino-Pakistani alliance. Zhou Enlai and Ayub Khan’s personal diplomacy became the bedrock of this partnership. India, in response, began modernizing its military with Soviet support, shifting from a non-aligned but idealist foreign policy to a more realist stance.
The Second Indo-Pakistani War and the Tashkent Agreement (1965)
In 1965, under the belief that the population of Indian-administered Kashmir would rise in revolt, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar to infiltrate forces into the region. The operation, sanctioned by President Ayub Khan and supported by Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, quickly escalated into a full-scale conflict when India responded with a broader military offensive.
India, led by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, mobilized significant military strength. The war resulted in heavy casualties on both sides, and neither country achieved a decisive military advantage. As international pressure mounted, the Soviet Union, under Premier Alexei Kosygin, facilitated peace talks in Tashkent (now Uzbekistan). The resulting Tashkent Agreement, signed in January 1966 by Shastri and Ayub Khan, restored the pre-war boundaries but failed to address the deeper Kashmir question. Shastri’s sudden death in Tashkent added a tragic dimension to the event.
China, though rhetorically supportive of Pakistan, remained militarily disengaged. Yet the 1965 war confirmed Beijing’s utility to Islamabad as a strategic counterbalance to New Delhi.
The 1971 War, Nuclear Ambitions, and the Creation of Bangladesh
By 1971, tensions between East and West Pakistan reached a boiling point, following the denial of electoral victory to the Awami League led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Brutal military repression by the Pakistani Army, under General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, led to a massive refugee crisis in India. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, after securing a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union signed with Premier Alexei Kosygin and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, decided to intervene militarily.
India launched a three-pronged offensive in December 1971. The war lasted just 13 days and ended with Pakistan’s unconditional surrender. Bangladesh was born, and Pakistan’s military morale was shattered. Over 90,000 Pakistani troops were taken prisoner. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who replaced Yahya Khan after the war, signed the Shimla Agreement with Indira Gandhi in 1972, which emphasized bilateralism in resolving disputes and redefined the ceasefire line in Kashmir as the new Line of Control. However, Kashmir remained unresolved.
In the aftermath, India conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran under Indira Gandhi’s leadership. Codenamed “Smiling Buddha,” the test was a watershed moment that introduced the nuclear element into the regional equation. Pakistan, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, responded by initiating its own covert nuclear weapons program, famously vowing that Pakistanis would “eat grass” to achieve nuclear parity.
China, led by Mao Zedong and Premier Zhou Enlai, offered diplomatic support to Pakistan but did not intervene. The Soviet Union, bound by its treaty with India, provided political cover for New Delhi in the United Nations.
Siachen, Brasstacks, and the Insurgency Era (1984–1989)
India’s military occupation of the Siachen Glacier through Operation Meghdoot in 1984 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi added a new dimension to the conflict. It was a pre-emptive move to prevent Pakistani control over the Saltoro Ridge and remains the highest battlefield in the world. Pakistan, led at the time by General Zia-ul-Haq, responded with militarized deployments, but no major reversal occurred.
By 1987, tensions escalated dramatically during the Brasstacks military exercises conducted by India under the direction of Army Chief General K. Sundarji and the government of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Pakistan interpreted these exercises as a prelude to war. General Zia’s diplomatic outreach—including his “cricket diplomacy” during a match in India—temporarily de-escalated tensions, but mistrust deepened.
That mistrust exploded in 1989 with the eruption of a full-blown insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir, which Pakistan supported through training, financing, and arming militant groups. This marked the beginning of Pakistan’s long-term strategy of “proxy war,” underpinned by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Groups like Hizbul Mujahideen and later Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were ideologically driven by Islamist narratives, yet tactically molded as instruments of Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine, aimed at bleeding India “through a thousand cuts.”
Clarifying Proxy Wars: Ideological Motivations and Deep-State Connections
The proxy wars in Kashmir and other parts of India are complex operations that often blur the lines between state-sanctioned military action and non-state actors. While groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed are officially deemed terrorist organizations, they operate with the active support of Pakistan’s deep state, particularly its military and intelligence agencies, which use these groups to pursue strategic objectives in Kashmir. These non-state actors, often ideologically motivated by radical Islamic principles, have become tools of Pakistani statecraft.
The ISI’s involvement in fostering, training, and arming these groups aligns with Pakistan’s desire to exert influence over Kashmir while maintaining plausible deniability. This strategic use of proxies is a cornerstone of Pakistan’s military doctrine, which aims to pressure India without engaging in direct warfare. These groups, therefore, serve not just as ideological warriors but as instruments of the state’s foreign policy.
For India, the use of proxies exacerbates the challenge of responding to an unconventional form of warfare. The insurgents’ ties to Pakistan’s military establishment complicate diplomatic solutions, as Islamabad denies any formal involvement in the militant activities despite overwhelming evidence. This dynamic underscores the difficulty of achieving lasting peace when one of the main actors in the conflict is engaged in proxy warfare rather than direct confrontation.
The Nuclear Arms Race: Pokhran-II, 1998, and the Kargil Conflict
India’s second round of nuclear tests in 1998 under Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee formalized its nuclear weapons capability. The tests, conducted at Pokhran, led to a swift and symmetrical response by Pakistan, then under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan’s tests in Chagai Hills made South Asia the first region with openly declared nuclear rivals sharing a direct border.
Despite this nuclearization, conflict erupted again in 1999. Pakistani soldiers and militants, under a covert plan by General Musharraf, infiltrated Indian positions in the Kargil sector. India responded with airstrikes and a determined ground campaign to reclaim lost territory. Though Sharif initially denied involvement, international diplomatic pressure—particularly from U.S. President Bill Clinton—forced Pakistan’s withdrawal.
China, under President Jiang Zemin, offered behind-the-scenes diplomatic support to Pakistan while urging de-escalation. The war deepened the civil-military divide in Pakistan and reinforced India’s belief in the need for constant vigilance.
The Proxy Wars, Militancy, and the Pahalgam Attack (2025)
Following Kargil, the conflict assumed an increasingly asymmetric shape. Pakistan’s ISI continued supporting non-state actors in Kashmir and beyond, including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. These groups, inspired by Salafi-jihadist ideology but calibrated by strategic objectives, were designed to exploit India’s internal vulnerabilities while providing Islamabad with plausible deniability. This led to catastrophic events like the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, both of which were traced back to Pakistan-based groups.
In 2025, the Pahalgam attack marked a grim milestone. Militants—believed to have received training, weapons, and ideological support from Pakistani networks—targeted civilian tourists in a high-casualty ambush. The incident, far from a rogue operation, reflected a broader strategic culture within sections of Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment that views militant proxies as tools of statecraft.
China, now under President Xi Jinping, maintains its strategic investment in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which traverses disputed territory in Gilgit-Baltistan. CPEC has effectively internationalized the Kashmir issue, at least in economic terms, tying China’s infrastructure interests to the region’s contested geography. Recent tensions with India—such as the 2017 Doklam standoff and the deadly Galwan Valley clash in 2020—highlight China’s increasing willingness to assert its territorial claims directly. In the aftermath of the 2025 Pahalgam attack, in which civilians, including foreign tourists, were targeted by militants with suspected links to Pakistani-based networks, China issued a cautious statement condemning the violence but stopped short of attributing responsibility. Instead, Beijing emphasized the importance of regional stability for economic cooperation, subtly reiterating its support for Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. India’s calls for stronger international condemnation were met with diplomatic silence from Beijing, reflecting China’s broader strategic imperative to shield its investments and sustain its geopolitical alignment with Islamabad.
Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, has grown closer to India through arms deals, joint military exercises, and diplomatic alignment in multilateral forums. Simultaneously, Pakistan has quietly deepened its strategic ties with Moscow, particularly through energy cooperation and defense discussions, signaling a subtle shift in regional alignments. Yet, even with these evolving realignments, the Indo-Pak conflict remains a persistent fault line.
Conclusion: Geopolitical Endurance Beyond Peace and War
The India-Pakistan rivalry, as it intersects with China’s ambitions and regional aspirations, is not a closed historical loop but a continually unfolding drama of strategic adaptation. What began as a dispute over princely accession has become a complex matrix of nationalist ideologies, military doctrines, and great power alignments.
No single agreement—not the Tashkent Declaration, not the Shimla Accord, not even the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 brokered by the World Bank and signed by Nehru and Ayub Khan—has resolved the core political tension. Instead, the rivalry persists across dimensions: territorial, nuclear, ideological, and psychological. It endures not only because of what each side claims, but because of what they fear losing: legitimacy, unity, and regional influence.
For China, the India-Pakistan fault line serves as both leverage and buffer. Its strategic calculus remains centered on preventing an India strong enough to challenge it, while anchoring Pakistan as a steadfast junior partner. For Pakistan, its alignment with China remains both a hedge and a dependency. For India, the dual-front dilemma continues to shape its military doctrines and foreign policy priorities.
As the world transitions into a multipolar era, South Asia’s stability will not be secured by declarations of peace, but by recognizing the persistence of unresolved historical narratives, embedded institutional distrust, and asymmetric incentives. Deterrence is now digital as well as nuclear; alliances are built not only on ideology but on infrastructure, trade, and intelligence sharing. The battlefield has expanded beyond borders to cyberspace, media, and the global economy.
The region stands not at the cusp of peace or war, but at the edge of strategic recalibration. To understand South Asia today is to confront the layered sediment of its past—wars fought, treaties signed, ambitions declared, and trust betrayed. It may not be a question of who blinks first, but of who is prepared to reinvent the strategic architecture of the subcontinent.
The subcontinent’s past is not just prologue—it is the scaffolding of its strategic imagination. Understanding it in full is not only a historian’s task but a strategist’s imperative.